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ABSTRACT 
 
POLITICS, SCHOLARSHIP AND DYNASTIC HISTORY: 
THE DEBATE BETWEEN THOMAS RUDDIMAN AND GEORGE LOGAN 
 
Bölücek, Cemal Alpgiray 
M.A., Department of History 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. C. D. A. Leighton 
 
September 2007 
 
 
In the first half of the eighteenth century, the debate between Thomas 
Ruddiman (1674-1757), a Jacobite classical scholar, historian, political writer and 
publisher, and the Rev. George Logan (1678-1755), had political characteristics. 
These two people produced refutations of each other’s treatises. 
The major distinction in the political environment in the first half of the 
eighteenth century, which inevitably determined the course of the debate between 
Ruddiman and Logan, was that of Whigs and Tories. The purpose of this thesis is to 
go beyond this and evaluate the scholarship by contemporary standards. Also, in the 
study of these contemporary authors, we see the conflicts of eighteenth-century 
Scotland, which take centre stage in political narrative. Besides, we also inevitably 
note the similarities of their thought in response to the world around them. 
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ÖZET 
 
SİYASET, BİLİM VE HANEDANLIK TARİHİ: THOMAS RUDDIMAN VE 
GEORGE LOGAN ARASINDAKİ TARTIŞMA 
 
Bölücek, Cemal Alpgiray 
Yüksel Lisans, Tarih Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. C. D. A. Leighton 
 
Eylül 2007 
 
 
Onsekizinci yüzyılın ilk yarısında jakobit bir bilgin, tarihçi, siyasi yazar ve 
yayıncı olan Thomas Ruddiman (1674-1757) ve Muhterem George Logan (1678-
1755) arasında yaşanan tartışma siyasi özellikteydi. Bu kişiler birbirinin tezlerine 
karşılık tekzipler yayınladılar. 
Ruddiman ve Logan arasındaki tartışmanın gidişatını ve özelliklerini 
belirleyen onsekizinci yüzyılın ilk yarısının siyasi atmosferidir; ve bu atmosferin en 
belirgin ayrışması da Liberaller (Whig’ler) ve Muhafazakarlar (Tory’ler) şeklinde 
ortaya çıkar. Bu tezin amacı, bu ayrışmanın ötesine geçerek tartışan tarafların 
bilimsel ve entelektüel yetkinlik ve yeteneklerini bulundukları çağın kriterlerine göre 
değerlendirmektir. Ayrıca, birbirinin çağdaşı olan bu iki entelektüelin tartışmasında, 
siyasi anlatılarının tam merkezinde, onsekizinci yüzyıl İskoçyası’nın ihtilaf ve 
çatışmalarını görürüz. Buna rağmen, kendilerini çevreleyen ortak olguların 
atmosferinde fikirlerinin ne derece benzeştiğini de belirtmeden geçemeyiz. 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Onsekizinci Yüzyıl İskoçyası, Siyasi Tarih, Tarih Yazımı, 
İskoç Entelektüel Tarihi, İskoç Hanedanlık Tarihi, Thomas Ruddiman, George 
Logan 
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TWO PRELIMINARY NOTES 
 
 
 
About Presbytery and Episcopacy: the religious quarrel 
 
Presbyterianism and Episcopacy are different types of church government. 
The name Presbyterian derives from the Greek word presbuteros (πρεσβύτερος), 
which means ‘elder’. On the other hand, Episcopal denominations derive their 
designation from the word episkopos (επισκοπος) meaning ‘bishop’. Simply, the 
difference is about the governance of the church by either bishops or elders. The 
origins of Presbyterianism, the rule of the ‘elders’, are in Calvinism, with principles 
of John Knox, the author of the First Book of Discipline, essentially shaped by the 
Scottish Reformation of 1560. The Church of Scotland, the Kirk, was formed along 
Presbyterian lines to become the established church of Scotland. In addition, John 
Knox had no clear explanation on the office of bishop. The crown inclined to appoint 
bishops and thus indirectly interfere in church government. As a result, in reaction, a 
party emerged headed by Andrew Melville, the author of the Second Book of 
Discipline. However, problems about the governance of the Kirk did not cease. 
Presbyterians and Episcopalian parties fought, often violently for supremacy. The 
Jacobite risings marked the final stage of this conflict. The fear was always that 
unless church government was based on bishops, who held divine authority by virtue 
of their succession to Christ’s apostles, it would be based on popular authority. 
Presbyterians, of course, denied this. 
viii 
 
 
About Jacobitism: the political quarrel 
Jacobite was the name of those who supported King James VII of Scotland 
and II of Britain, as a response to his deposition in 1688. The term Jacobite was 
derived from the Latin, Jacobus, meaning James. The Jacobite movement was aimed 
at the restoration to the thrones of Scotland and England of that branch of the Stuart 
dynasty, which had been replaced by Mary II and her husband, William of Orange. 
Jacobite support derived from a troubled political environment, notably created by 
the circumstances of the Union of 1707 between Scotland and England, which was 
highly unpopular with the majority of the population in Scotland. Moreover, James 
was a Catholic, who was trying to introduce religious toleration for Catholics and 
also for Protestant Dissenters. This was a threat to the established religious and 
political system, but attracted the involvement of rival, Catholic powers such as 
France and Spain, and to the support of the Episcopalian community and to that was 
added that of the Pope. The Episcopalians were at odds with the Presbyterian 
settlement. Jacobitism in Scotland found its roots primarily on these grounds. Soon, 
it turned into a military struggle against the Hanoverian regime. The military history 
of Jacobitism is full of unsuccessful attempts. There are four major conflicts, apart 
from the minor clashes. In Ireland, ignited by the Siege of Derry by the Jacobite 
forces in 1689, with the support of Louis XIV of France, a war between Jacobites 
and the forces of William III began, ending in 1691, after the defeat of James’s 
forces at the Battle of Boyne. James fled to France. In Scotland, with the support of 
the Episcopalian Highland clans, the Dundee rising in 1689 and the Battle of 
Killiecrankie took place; but the revolt ended in surrender. In addition, there were 
two important insurrections, one in 1715 and the other in 1745. The ‘Fifteen’ rising 
ix 
 
was led by John Erskine, Earl of Mar, who was capable in organising such a large 
scale rising, but very poor as a general. At the battle of Sherriffmuir, where the 
Jacobites outnumbered the Hanoverian forces by two to one, Mar failed to win a 
decisive victory. Again, in the ‘Forty-Five’ rising the Jacobite army led by Charles 
Edward Stuart, known as Bonnie Prince Charlie, failed to advance far enough south 
and retreated to the Highlands of Scotland, to be finally defeated at Culloden Moor 
near Inverness in 1746. After the defeat of France in the Seven Years War, 
Jacobitism ceased to be a military threat and entered a permanent decline. However, 
it had a considerable influence on the political and cultural life of Scotland. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
In eighteenth-century Scotland, intellectual disputes as well as 
historiographical discussions may profitably be read with reference to the political 
atmosphere of that day. Equally, the scholarly publications in the first half of the 
century are frequently highly relevant to those who produce works on the life of 
Scotland from the Revolution of 1688 to the end of the first half of the century, 
leaving the latter as a rather arbitrary border. Furthermore, phenomena related to the 
restless atmosphere of the previous centuries, the Reformation, the Restoration, and 
the Revolution, still affected the modes of discussions, the intellectual and the 
religious tensions, the political treatises etc. of the eighteenth century. Clarifying 
reasonable links from actual political events to the scholarly phenomena, or vice 
versa, may, of course easily trap readers and writers, who observe the literature only 
superficially. However, the discipline of literary criticism illuminates the path 
towards achieving a critical approach to certain material – dissertations, pieces of 
poetry, ephemeral pamphlets, treatises written in controversy, articles, etc. – which 
may contain obvious political or religious bias, or not. Unless scholars of a certain 
period explicitly mention their political intentions or depict their objects with certain 
 2
political or religious bias, indifferent to an objective approach in their works, 
searching the ultimate aim or motivations of that work only within a political 
framework is less than helpful. Nevertheless, while making studies either of pieces of 
historical writing or political treatises in this form written to assert certain 
convictions, one should bear in mind that the most important matters are the 
accuracy of the historical data and the success of the argumentation in a work. We 
cannot expect scholars to produce works which are free from any ideological and 
religious commitment. However, the level of accuracy and historical accomplishment 
found in a treatise, politically imbued and biased, or not, still allow it to be evaluated 
and appreciated. One should also approach one’s object of criticism with reference to 
literary taste. 
Neither scholarly dissertations and treatises, nor, frequently, politically 
imbued pamphlets for that matter give certain evidence to the reader to assert the 
political inclinations of scholarly authors or the motivations in their works, merely by 
themselves. One must be wary of bringing together data from political history and 
intellectual history to prove certain theses or claims. Explaining the political 
panorama of the period is not such an impossible task, of course, but one should 
refrain from acquiring an attitude towards an author that detaches him from the 
history of academic activity. The proper attitude, maybe still arguably, is to look at 
the primary material firstly as a source of intellectual history. This may prevent the 
modern reader from sliding into the danger of reasoning directly from the ideological 
stance of an eighteenth-century scholar to the content of his works, or following the 
reverse course. The reader must avoid an inclination to associate every assertion in a 
work with the ideological or religious position of its author. In the end, one can 
easily find oneself propagandising the data out of its scholarly context. 
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In the first half of the eighteenth century, the debate between Thomas 
Ruddiman (1674-1757), a Jacobite classical scholar, historian, political writer and 
publisher, and the Rev. George Logan (1678-1755), had obvious political 
characteristics. These two men produced extended refutations of each other’s 
treatises. The approach in this study, which aims at focusing on this debate 
appropriately, is to give the religious and ideological characteristics of the parties 
debating on intellectual grounds as part of the biographical information on both. This 
is offered in the opening section. This will serve for understanding the positions of 
the two debaters towards each other. Nevertheless, the appraisal of their writings will 
not assume ideological commitment. The study is of the argumentation of both 
writers as figures in intellectual history. Both Ruddiman and Logan had ideological 
motivations for producing their works. Nevertheless, their studies cannot be 
categorised as either merely political pamphlets announcing political ideas and 
concepts to the public or as pieces of political and religious propaganda. In the 
atmosphere of eighteenth-century Scotland, Ruddiman and Logan emerge as parties 
in a lively debate, in which extensive and successful use of historical argumentation 
is obvious. In their treatment of a wide variety of issues, the works of Ruddiman and 
Logan, particularly focusing on the dynastic history and the constitution of Scotland, 
display a degree of quality and success in argumentation and rhetoric, regardless of 
their different ideological stances. However, the political discourses inherited by 
Ruddiman, an Episcopalian Jacobite, and Logan, a Whig Presbyterian, do need to be 
made clear. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
RUDDIMAN AND LOGAN: JACOBITE AND WHIG 
 
 
 
II.1 The Politics of the Age 
 
The major distinction in the political environment in the first half of the 
eighteenth century, which inevitably, though partially, determined the course of the 
debate between Ruddiman and Logan, was that between Whigs and Tories. Tory 
ideology, depicted by H.T. Dickinson as “the ideology of order” can, most profitably, 
be traced back to the Restoration of 1660.1 Tory political theory, within its five 
component elements of absolute monarchy, indefeasible hereditary succession, 
divine ordination, passive obedience and non-resistance, grants power and authority 
to the Crown to a more marked degree. This ideology, according to Dickinson, 
partially derived from the political theory of classical antiquity, from Roman law and 
from medieval thought, and came to England in the sixteenth century through the 
work of Jean Bodin. Once merely a set of political ideas, Toryism realised itself by 
filling a political vacuum after the Restoration. Hoping to maintain order in Church 
and State, the landowners of England and a large proportion of the Anglican clergy 
upheld its theories. In 1688 these doctrines suffered a serious blow in the Revolution 
                                                 
1 H. T. Dickinson, Liberty and Property: Political Ideology in Eighteenth-Century Britain (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), 13. 
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of that year and never entirely recovered. However, certain principles of Tory 
ideology remained and formed the core of Jacobite ideology in the following period. 
Tory ideology determined the conservative path in British politics, and thus certain 
elements of it can be found in the conservative ideology of Hanoverian Britain, 
which is, in a degree, misleadingly labelled as “Whig”.2 
Whig theory, claimed as a “theory of liberty,” is not to be perceived as liberal. 
However, after the Revolution of 1688, principles of social contract, the ultimate 
sovereignty of the people, and the natural rights of men became more entertainable 
than before. The implications of these principles were, however, very limited, from a 
modern perspective. Only a small minority of Whigs adhered to extreme positions 
that can be approximated to the definitions such principles were later given. In 
general, most Whigs desired political power and a “stable, orderly, even hierarchical 
society which would protect the privileges and property of the wealthy and 
influential.”3 They held, to a greater extent than Tories, that the power of the Crown 
was not unlimited, and should be limited by the power of Parliament. Dickinson 
argues that if the Whigs had been free to establish their own political order in 1689, 
they would have probably put more limitations on the Crown, but their system would 
certainly not have been one that pointed to a democratic system of government or a 
liberal order. This argument is in accord with the main trends of political history, 
since the constitutional order and general patterns of politics did not, in fact, change. 
Moreover, conservative political settlements became advantageous to those who 
began to enjoy the benefits of office, and the Whigs toned down their views. 
                                                 
2 Ibid., 14. 
3 Ibid., 57-9. 
 6
Anyway, it may be said that after the Revolution of 1688, the theories that supported 
the absolute monarchy of Stuarts were somewhat diluted.4 
If one intends to achieve a degree of clarity on the differences between the 
Whig and the Tory, the important point to focus on is the type of the monarchy. Both 
the Whigs and the Tories wanted order and stability “in which men of property 
would be safe.”5 However, Whig thought included the idea that this safety could only 
be achieved under a limited and controlled monarchy. The absence of a clear cut 
difference between the two groups appears in the later decades of the first half of the 
eighteenth century, in that Jacobite thought, doctrines of religious toleration, and 
constitutional debates were all affected by the events and unique characteristics of 
the period. Although the eighteenth century can be seen as a triumphant period for 
Whig thought, it should be reiterated that ideals of absolutism did not cease to exist, 
and Whig ideas became more varied.6 The Tory ideas and Whig political lines of 
thought are examined in detail through the following chapters of this work, which 
focuses on the debate on the Scottish constitution between Ruddiman and Logan. 
While the fundamentals of modern conservatism were coming into existence 
with heavy Whig influence, Jacobite thought was taking its place in either peaceful 
intellectual realms or militant and revolutionary events and phenomena. The 
foundations of support for Jacobitism as observed by modern historians were 
numerous: the ideological support of the Catholic community and Episcopalian 
Church for the Jacobite cause; the Whig-Tory dichotomy; the widespread dislike of 
the Act of Union; economic and cultural differences between Highland and Lowland 
Scotland; resentment over taxation; the utility of the Stuart cause to foreign 
                                                 
4 J. A. W. Gunn, Beyond Liberty and Property: The Process of Self-Recognition in Eighteenth-
Century Political Thought (Kinston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1983), 120. 
5 Dickinson, Liberty and Property, 59. 
6 Gunn, Beyond Liberty and Property, 120-1. 
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governments, etc.7 As a sequence of events, when James VII and II was overthrown 
by the Dutch prince, William of Orange, in the so-called ‘Glorious Revolution’, the 
Jacobites were committed to the restoration of the Stuarts to the thrones of England, 
Ireland and Scotland. The main tenet of Jacobitism, at the heart of it, was that the 
rights of kingship are purely hereditary and indefeasible.8 However, there were other 
factors stimulated by economic, social, religious and political circumstances and 
developments, which confirmed many in, and attracted others to, the Stuart cause. 
Consequently, the history of Jacobitism in Scotland is not an easy issue that can be 
understood in simple causalities. At present, it may be said, historians tend to 
emphasise the decision in 1690 to impose a Presbyterian settlement on the Scottish 
church, welding Episcopalianism and Jacobitism together in the same cause. Stress is 
also put on the credibility and support given to Jacobitism by the support of most of 
Catholic Europe, especially France. Though other powers, Austria, Spain and 
Sweden, made use of Jacobitism, the French support for the uprisings was the most 
important, particularly taking into account its effects on Highland Jacobitism.9 
However, Jacobitism flourished for many reasons, and anti-Jacobitism was 
correspondingly varied.  
II.2 Thomas Ruddiman 
In the intellectual realm in the eighteenth-century Scotland, a strong voice for 
the Jacobite cause was Thomas Ruddiman. Pittock introduces him as “the famous 
                                                 
7 See Frank McLynn, Charles Edward Stuart: A Tragedy in Many Acts (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), 125; T. M. Devine, The Scottish Nation: A History, 1700-2000 
(London: Allen Lane, 1999), 33-47, 17, 232-3; Dickinson, Liberty and Property, 39-45, 124; Murray 
G. H. Pittock, Jacobitism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), chap. 3, passim. 
8 T.M. Devine, Clanship to Crofters’ War: The Social Transformation of the Scottish Highlands 
(Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 1994) 19. 
9 F.J. McLynn, France and the Jacobite Rising of 1745 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1981), 1-
3; Stephen Conway, “Continental Connections: Britain and Europe in the Eighteenth Century,” 
History 90 (2005), 356. 
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Jacobite” while quoting his views on Scottish agricultural purity.10 The fame of 
Ruddiman was acquired through his intellectual endeavours, his publishing 
experience and other elements in his biography. He was born in October, 1674 in the 
parish of Boyndie, Banffshire, the son of a royalist farmer, James Ruddiman. His 
academic career started at Inverboyndie parish school where he pursued classical 
studies under George Morison. He was sixteen when he left home to compete for the 
prize and bursary for classical learning at the King’s College, Aberdeen, without the 
permission or knowledge of his parents. This was the beginning of his career, and a 
decision determining his life. He won the prize and matriculated in the college with a 
bursary, in November 1690. After his graduation in 1694, he worked as tutor to the 
family of Sir John Ogilvy, of Inverquharity, and then as tutor to the son of Robert 
Young of Auldbar. The latter job helped him to secure the post of schoolmaster at 
Laurencekirk, Kincardineshire. Dr. Archibald Pitcairne, whom he met in 1699, 
persuaded him to go to Edinburgh and try his luck there, by providing his support. 
Ruddiman began working as a copyist in the Advocates’ Library, Edinburgh. His 
career from copyist to the Keeper of the Library began in 1702, when he became 
assistant librarian. In 1706, he met Robert Freebairn, an Edinburgh printer and 
bookseller, who employed him as an editor and proofreader. Ruddiman and 
Freebairn shared the same ideological views: both were loyal Episcopalians and 
supported Jacobite principles. In the following years, Ruddiman prepared many 
works for the press.11 After he had established his own printing business in 1712, he 
                                                 
10 Emphasis on the agricultural purity of Scotland was a way of asserting that “luxury and vanity had 
replaced primitivism and simplicity” as a result of the “imperial consumption of a greater Britain.” 
See Murray G. H. Pittock, The Invention of Scotland: The Stuart Myth and the Scottish Identity, 1630 
to the Present (London: Routledge, 1991), 36; Douglas Duncan, Thomas Ruddiman: A Study in 
Scottish Scholarship of the Early Eighteenth Century (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1965), 149-50. 
11 The earliest of his works included Sir Robert Sibbald’s Introductio ad historiam rerum a Romanis 
gestarum (1706), Sir Robert Spottiswood’s Praticks of the Laws of Scotland (1706), Florence 
Wilson’s De animi tranquillitate dialogus (1707), et al. For all of his publications and edited works, 
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chose schoolbooks as his market, which was broadening and promised a guaranteed 
profit. His own Rudiments of the Latin Tongue (1714, second edition 1716) was first 
published by Freebairn. On the second edition’s title page, it was indicated that the 
book was now “printed and sold by the author.” Reaching to fifteen editions in his 
lifetime, this book remained the standard Latin grammar book for the rest of the 
century in Britain, representing its author as the foremost Latinist of Scotland.12 
Together with his Rudiments, which spread his fame as a Latinist, his edition for 
Freebairn of George Buchanan’s Opera Omnia (1715) determined the rest of his 
career and his literary and historical fields of controversy. According to Douglas 
Duncan, with these two works, Ruddiman “fixed the boundaries of his scholarly 
concerns,” consolidating rather than extending his interests thereafter. 13 In his career 
as a Latinist, he marked his success by printing his Grammaticae Latinae 
Institutiones (Pars Prima, 1725; Pars Secunda, 1731), which was aimed at classical 
scholars. As a historian and classical scholar, his edition of Buchanan was very 
important and was to involve him in political debates. In the biographical 
introduction of the Opera Omnia, Ruddiman criticised Buchanan’s views and his 
character, especially his anti-monarchical views, not wishing to reveal his own 
Jacobitism. As a very important literary figure, Buchanan’s political views, though 
his literary excellence was universally accepted, were very extreme, making him the 
most radical of all the Calvinist revolutionary thinkers.14 Ruddiman’s edition of the 
Opera Omnia (1715), in the year of a Jacobite rebellion, ensured that his criticisms 
aroused a high level of reaction from the Whig and Presbyterian establishment in 
                                                                                                                                          
see A. P. Woolrich, “Ruddiman, Thomas (1674-1757),” in Oxford D.N.B.; and Duncan, Ruddiman, 
passim. 
12 Woolrich, “Ruddiman,” Oxford D.N.B. 
13 Duncan, Ruddiman, 3-4. 
14 Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Volume Two: The Age of 
Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 301. 
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Scotland.15 The reactions to Ruddiman from his contemporaries will be described in 
detail in the course this work. 
In 1724, Ruddiman took over a newspaper appearing three times a week, the 
Caledonian Mercury, a moderate Jacobite publication which attracted little attention. 
In 1729, he devoted more attention to the newspaper, which remained in the family 
until 1772. However, his major contribution was that to the Advocates’ Library. 
After he had been appointed Keeper of the Advocates’ Library in 1730, it grew 
extensively; during his twenty two years as keeper, he enriched the collection from 
about 9,000 volumes to about 20,000 volumes, ensuring a continuous supply of 
books from Stationers’ Hall, London. On 13 August 1739, Ruddiman partially 
resigned his printing business to his son Thomas and bought himself a house in 
Parliament Square, close to the Advocates’ Library. In 1752, he resigned form his 
post in the Library, being succeeded by David Hume. He died in Edinburgh at the 
age of eighty-two, on 19 January 1757, and was buried in a grave not to be identified 
in Greyfriars Kirkyard.16 
Apart from the dissertations and pamphlets of both Ruddiman and his 
adversaries, there is only a small number of sources that can be examined for detailed 
information about Ruddiman’s life. The earliest, most detailed and quite reliable 
source is a biography of Ruddiman by George Chalmers (1742-1825), a Scottish 
historian and political writer. As a biographer, he published lives of Daniel Defoe 
(1786) and Sir John Davies (1786). His Life of Thomas Pain [sic] (1793) was an 
entertaining and popular attack on the personal and public morals of the famous 
radical. His greatest biographical study, however, was of Mary, Queen of Scots 
(1818). His critical works do have a clear royalist bias, which is related to his own 
                                                 
15 Woolrich, “Ruddiman,” Oxford D.N.B. 
16 Ibid. 
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experiences of the American Rebellion and the French Revolution. This includes his 
Life of Thomas Ruddiman (1794). On the other hand, his invaluable antiquarian 
work, Caledonia, which remains unfinished because of his death, embraces the 
Roman, the Pictish, the Scottish, and the Scoto-Saxon periods, from 80 to 1306 
AD.17 Chalmers had his talents in biography, reaching to a level of historical 
reliability. However, together with its presentation of facts about Ruddiman, this 
biography presents a mass of information and comment not directly related to the 
subject itself. One methodological criticism of Chalmers comes from Duncan, who 
complained of his “failure to relate Ruddiman critically to the changing intellectual 
world of his day, a failure which was particularly aggravated by angry political 
bias.”18 Duncan’s criticism was that Chalmers failed to see Ruddiman ignoring the 
main current of the Scottish Enlightenment, as he himself ignored “the changing 
intellectual world” of that day. However, Duncan’s own bias in favour of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, which he apparently thought of as inevitable change and progress, 
ought to be noted in this criticism. Duncan’s criticisms of his eighteenth-century 
counterpart (Chalmers) help readers to redefine the ideological and intellectual 
stances of both, for and against the Enlightenment. 
Chalmers’s biography of Ruddiman is 467 pages in length and, as remarked, 
the most reliable source on the life of the latter. On the title page, there is a portrait of 
Ruddiman and a short notice about his post as the keeper of the Advocates’ Library 
for almost fifty years. Chalmers declares that his book was written “to preserve the 
remembrance of a scholar, who, by his labours, promoted the interests of learning, 
and to protect a character, which, for its probity, may be offered, as an example, to 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
18 Duncan, Ruddiman, 6. In the footnote of the same page, Duncan emphasises the indispensability of 
Chalmers for the student of the relevant period, adding that no attempt is to be made to supersede him 
as a factual source. 
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imitation.”19 The biography was certainly eulogistic. In his opening chapter, with a 
couple of pages, he indicates his reason for writing such an admiring study: 
Of the numbers of men, who have benefited our fathers by their studies, and 
added to the reputation of Great Britain by their learning, few will be found to 
be better entitled to biographical notice, than Ruddiman, whether we consider 
the usefulness of his works, the modesty of his nature, or the disinterestedness 
of his spirit. He too was incited to employ “laborious days,” and sleepless 
nights, by the hope, that posterity would at last award him the justice, which 
his contemporaries often denied him. This time is now come, when an 
attempt is made, to fulfil his wish, by endeavouring to state his pretensions, 
and to estimate his worth. In making this attempt, after abler writers had 
relinquished the task, it has fallen to my lot, to collect the incidents of his life; 
in order that his merits may be known, and his example may be followed.20 
 
However, critics doubted the necessity of devoting such a long book on the life of 
Ruddiman. Grace A. Cockroft, the twentieth-century biographer of Chalmers, 
agreed. According to Cockroft, Chalmers 
…exposed himself to reproof and ridicule through having devoted a book 
much too bulky, much too pompous, much too contentious, and much too 
panegyrical, to a provincial grammarian.21 
 
Duncan, as a twentieth-century biographer of Ruddiman, argues that it was 
obvious that the “taunt of provincialism” had no meaning for the Scot, Chalmers, 
adding the observation that Chalmers was so much in sympathy with Ruddiman’s 
world that “he failed to see how fully it had disintegrated.”22 Present day historians, 
conscious of the continuing importance of Jacobitism, might well disagree that it 
had. True, Chalmers lacked a critical approach towards Ruddiman. However, 
Chalmers had an obvious sympathy with Ruddiman, and a political ideology in 
common, and the biography makes a valuable contribution to the understanding of its 
                                                 
19 George Chalmers, The life of Thomas Ruddiman, A.M. the keeper, for almost fifty years, of the 
library belonging to the Faculty of Advocates, at Edinburgh: ... By George Chalmers, F.R.S S.A. 
(London, 1794), unpaginated advertisement. 
20 Ibid., 2. 
21 Grace A. Cockroft, The Public Life of George Chalmers, (New York, 1939), 191, cited in Duncan, 
Ruddiman, 8. 
22 Duncan, Ruddiman, 8. 
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subject and gives reliable information. Nevertheless, Duncan’s criticism about the 
obvious pro-Ruddiman stance of Chalmers is not without merit.  
Another answer can be put forward in an attempt to explain the need of 
Chalmers to devote a large book to Ruddiman, the cause of Cockroft’s disapproval. 
The biography of Ruddiman reveals its author’s political antagonism towards 
Buchanan. Chalmers took Buchanan as a figure representing the opposite of his own 
beliefs and ideas, especially taking into account Buchanan’s career as a political 
writer after the dethronement of Queen Mary. In this respect, Chalmers’s biography 
of Ruddiman, specifically regarding Ruddiman’s opposition to the doctrines 
supported by Buchanan, gave an opportunity to Chalmers to speak of Buchanan. 
Duncan’s criticisms frequently referred the quality of Chalmers’s study as a 
biography, with much reference to his political bias. In fact, his study served chiefly 
his interest in finding grounds to attack political Calvinism in the form of a 
biography, rather than presenting a Scottish librarian and political writer to his 
audience. Additionally, Chalmers’s Life of Ruddiman was less praise of Ruddiman 
himself, more of the strength of the perennial Jacobitism he symbolised.23 This 
understanding is quite important for this present study. If we disregard the 
sentimental descriptions and phrases of Chalmers, and take no notice of present day 
rules for writing biography, the Life of Ruddiman can illuminate the patterns of the 
discussion between Ruddiman and Logan, as a reliable source for true information on 
both of them.  
Through Ruddiman’s publications, especially those produced during the long 
debate with Logan, one can better understand the extent of Ruddiman’s scholarly 
talents and his importance for his period. As Duncan’s book is an attempt to take a 
                                                 
23 C.D.A. Leighton, “George Chalmers and the Reformation: Writing Scottish history in the Age of 
Counter-Revolution and Restoration." Archivium Hibernicum, 59 (2005): 290-305. 
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negative approach to Ruddiman, there is a need to consider the scholarly attributes of 
Ruddiman, as a complement. Duncan argued that Chalmers failed “to submit him 
[Ruddiman] to a proper critical test.”24 A critical approach in biography might be 
necessary to reach a certain degree of credibility and readability. However, in 
political and intellectual history writing, it is indispensable. Apart from A. P. 
Woolrich’s biographical article, there are only two detailed studies on the life of 
Ruddiman, one an eighteenth-century work (Chalmers’s), and the other is now 
almost as dated in outlook (Duncan’s). Neither of them contains satisfactory 
comment about Ruddiman’s debate with Logan, and the significance of this in 
eighteenth-century discussion. Time and space are important determining an author’s 
works. Noting initially that Ruddiman ignited a debate, by a scholarly work, 
published in Edinburgh in the year of a Jacobite rebellion, provoking opposition from 
other scholars on the constitutional nature of the Scottish state and hereditary right, it 
is to be said that such local and temporal detail, which can be extracted by bringing 
together political and intellectual history, will help readers to understand the debate 
more clearly. 
II.3 George Logan 
In contrast to the high reputation of Ruddiman, and the quantity of comment 
on him, there is very limited amount of material about Logan. Interestingly, the data 
on Logan usually can be found in biographies of Ruddiman, as a figure in a part of 
his life. George Logan (1678-1755) was a Church of Scotland minister and religious 
controversialist, the son of George (or James) Logan who was a merchant and 
burgess of Glasgow, and Elizabeth, daughter of John Cunningham, minister of Old 
Cumnock. In 1693, he entered the Greek class at Glasgow University and received 
                                                 
24 Duncan, Ruddiman, 9. 
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his MA in 1696. He went on to study divinity, preparing for the ministry. He was 
listed as a student of divinity at Glasgow in 1697. On 4 March 1703, he was licensed 
to preach by the presbytery of Glasgow. After that, he became chaplain to John, earl 
of Lauderdale. On 6 February 1707, he was called to Lauder, a parish in 
Berwickshire. He was ordained on 8 May 1707. His marriage to Anne Home, on 5 
April 1711, produced a son and a daughter. On 16 October 1718, the duke of 
Roxburghe presented him to the parish of Sprouston in Roxburghshire. He was 
admitted to the parish on 22 January 1719. Having been presented by the duke of 
Roxburghe again, he was relocated to the parish of Dunbar in East Lothian, in 1722. 
In his new place, he published his first work, the Essay upon Gospel and Legal 
Preaching, in 1723.25 
Logan was called to Trinity parish in Edinburgh, on 31 August 1732, and 
admitted on 14 December. On 8 May 1740, he was elected moderator of the General 
Assembly which deposed dissident ministers, including Ebenezer Erskine, who 
would later become the chief founder of the Secession Church and who had strongly 
resisted the use of patronage in selecting parish ministers. The debated issue of 
patronage had motivated Logan to produce controversial publications. From 1732 to 
1733, he published A Modest and Humble Inquiry, followed by separately published 
Continuations, one in each year. In 1736, he published An Overture for a Right 
Constitution of the General Assembly. In the following year, he published The 
lawfulness and necessity of ministers their reading the act of parliament for bringing 
to justice the murderers of Captain John Porteous (1737), supporting the 
government’s interpretation of the Edinburgh riots of 1736. As a Whig and 
Presbyterian thinker, Logan naturally opposed Jacobitism. He argued that Edinburgh 
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should be placed in a state of defence during the Jacobite rising of 1745. When the 
city was seized by Jacobite forces, Logan left the city. The Jacobite army used his 
house at Castlehill as a guardhouse. He spent the 1740s in the lively debate with 
Ruddiman. His last publication was a work published in 1749, in which he defended 
the reputation of the important Presbyterian figure, Alexander Henderson. He died in 
Edinburgh on 13 October 1755.26 
Logan contributed to the controversy between Whigs and Jacobites over 
Scotland’s monarchy and indefeasible hereditary right and this gave him a certain 
reputation as a Whig political thinker. His ideas were centred on historiographical 
arguments that were thought to serve Whig claims against indefeasible hereditary 
right and favouring parliamentary legitimacy.27 Logan’s arguments revolve around 
ius regni in the Scottish hereditary line and historical proof for it. He represented the 
Whig Presbyterian case for a limited monarchy, not strictly hereditary by 
primogeniture, against Jacobites such as Ruddiman. In 1717, a group of Whigs, 
including the patriotic historian James Anderson, whose book was edited 
posthumously by Ruddiman under the title Selectus Diplomatum et Numismatum 
Scotiae Thesaurus (1739), formed the “Associated Critics” to engage in Whig-
Jacobite controversy. Their main objective was to defend the reputation of 
Buchanan,28 whose political and historical views were central to Scottish Whig-
Presbyterian ideology, refuting the “slanders” of Ruddiman. Logan and his associates 
intended to deal with this edition of Buchanan’s works from two points of view: 
Ruddiman carefully sorted out every single piece in Buchanan’s Opera Omnia that 
might somehow serve Whig interests, especially Buchanan’s passages attempting to 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 See Colin Kidd, Subverting Scotland’s Past: Scottish Whig Historians and the Creation of an 
Anglo-British identity, 1689-c. 1830 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 84-5 and 88-95. 
28 “The standard Whig account of the Fergusian monarchy was derived from Buchanan.” Ibid., 83. 
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provide historical evidence for anti-monarchical views; and he tried to strengthen his 
Jacobite position by attacking one of the most prominent figures in Scotland of its 
Whig interpretation of history. The Whig-Jacobite controversy had found itself some 
topics in this controversial work by Ruddiman. The aim of the “Associated Critics” 
was to produce another edition of Buchanan’s works that would be freed from 
Jacobite commentary, treating Buchanan as his importance to Whig ideology 
required. From one point of view, their goal was to “rehabilitate their clay-footed 
idol,” freeing him from the hands of a Jacobite critic.29 They only managed to write 
eighty pages of notes against the criticisms of Ruddiman, but an edition of 
Buchanan’s works was begun. The project was never completed, but Logan himself 
entered a “lively literary combat”30 with Ruddiman that spanned the 1740s. He 
produced his major studies in this period. His Treatise on Government (1746), which 
centred on the argument that the Scottish monarchy was not strictly hereditary in the 
manner Jacobites held it to be, was not a counter-argument to Ruddiman but an 
independent argument, following the same path as Buchanan’s. The others were A 
Second Treatise on Government (1747), The Doctrine of the Jure-Divino-Ship of 
Hereditary Indefeasible Monarchy Enquired Into and Exploded, in a Letter to Mr 
Thomas Ruddiman and A Second Letter (1749). As noted above, the period before he 
entered the debate with Ruddiman was not unfruitful though for Logan, and his 
earlier works aid the understanding of the debate with Ruddiman. The debate 
between Logan and Ruddiman comprehended religious disputes, one of which, for 
example, related to the seventeenth-century Presbyterian figure, Alexander 
Henderson. Other Episcopalian and Presbyterian points of views on different and 
divergent issues were also an important part in the debate, which can be seen more 
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fully in the arguments of Logan’s “firm assertion” of the right of people to choose 
the ministers of their religion, and Ruddiman’s counter-arguments and his 
commitment to “divinely ordained [ministerial] succession.”31 
The difficulty about clarifying the background information on Logan is that 
the secondary material on him is gathered together in the studies of Ruddiman. Apart 
from the data that can be collected from the Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, which is merely a collection from other secondary material, the two 
biographies of Ruddiman (Chalmers’s and Duncan’s) comprehend the densest 
information on Logan. Thus, Ruddiman, in the field of academic study seems to 
overshadow Logan. However, this leaves us to analyse Logan’s own works once 
more, for understanding the influence of politics and religious stances on the 
interpretation of history and attempts to exploit history to find support for these 
different political positions. 
Logan was not the only person who entered into controversy with Ruddiman. 
John Love, rector of Dalkeith Grammar School, and James Man, master of the 
Aberdeen Poor House, were two others who produced refutations of Ruddiman’s 
works. Yet, after Ruddiman published counter-arguments to theirs, they did not 
seem, arguably, eager or competent to continue the debate. Though the debate with 
Man came later primarily to revolve around philological issues, the conflict centred 
on Ruddiman’s provocative accounts on Buchanan’s History and Anderson’s 
Diplomata.32 There is no particular explanation of why Logan was the most 
important opponent of Ruddiman, although zeal and his ability to enter such lively 
debate, and the qualities of the works of Ruddiman while he was refuting Logan’s 
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claims, which cannot be seen in his debate with Love,33 can be cited as reasons for 
this “long war” between them. Furthermore, Logan found it absolutely necessary to 
protect Buchanan, who was of “canonical significance for Scottish Whigs” and to 
whom “Scottish whiggism in its anti-Jacobite and historical manifestation remained 
tied” in the intellectual battlefield. 34 
According to Duncan, the debate in general can be explained as centred 
chiefly on three issues, though they cannot be separated from each other in a clear-
cut way. One of them related to the arguments around the claims of Robert Bruce 
and John Balliol to the Scottish Crown. In this issue, Logan supported the claim of 
Balliol, arguing that the “exclusions of his descendents from the right to succeed” 
was a disregard of the hereditary principle, while Ruddiman preferred to support 
Bruce’s claim as being in accordance with proximity of blood, the constitution of the 
time and the laws of God. The second issue in their debate was the question of the 
legitimacy of Robert III. Logan tried to point out a break in the hereditary succession 
here by showing that the children of Robert II and his mistress Elizabeth Muir had 
been “legitimated by papal dispensation.” Ruddiman devoted 242 pages in his 
Answer to Logan on the legitimacy of Robert III. The third issue concerned the “pre-
historic” Scottish kings and constituted the most confusing part in the debate. It was 
the point that both Logan and Ruddiman agreed upon: they both thought that the list 
of early monarchs presented by John of Fordun (d. c. 1384), the first chronicler to 
create a continuous history of Scotland, was unreliable. However, each approached 
the issue from his own point of view. Ruddiman argued the antiquity of the royal 
line, and Logan attempted to show that it contained bastards and usurpers.35 
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II.4 Specimens of Work 
We may turn back to the earlier works of the two writers for the sake of 
ascertaining the scholarly attributes and political discourses of the debating parties, 
and separately comment on their intellectual abilities. It would be a useful attempt to 
consider both outside the context of their lively debate, in order to better comprehend 
their scholarly skills and their rhetoric. For Ruddiman, one can cite numerous works, 
including the studies of different scholars he favoured and published with his own 
introductory notes. These certainly show his scholarship, argumentation and 
rhetorical skill. Since the chief interest of this study is the debate of Ruddiman and 
Logan, we may concentrate on their works and be selective. To look at the works of 
Logan and try to understand his way of grasping a certain subject and speculating on 
it, we may either take his earlier works on church affairs, some of which are, for 
example, A Modest and Humble Inquiry Concerning the Right and Power of Electing 
and Calling Ministers to Vacant Churches (1732), or look at his Treatise of 1746, 
which occasioned conflict, but was not part of it. Ruddiman’s Vindication of Mr. 
George Buchanan’s Paraphrase of the Book of Psalms (1745) might also be noted, 
though, it is indeed part of a debate. However, the side of Ruddiman seen here is 
somewhat different from the one which is seen in his debate with Logan. 
The title page of this work of Ruddiman includes a summary of the content of 
the book.36 As it can thus be seen, Ruddiman deals with and criticises William 
Benson’s (bap. 1682, d. 1754) edition of Arthur Johnston’s (1587-1641) version of 
the Psalms. Johnston was a poet, born in Aberdeenshire, the son of a wealthy iron 
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merchant. He had a chance to travel abroad to Hanover and Stockholm early in life, 
was rector of King’s College, Aberdeen, and later on a professor in Heidelberg. 
When he produced a criticism of George Eglishem’s criticisms of George 
Buchanan’s translation of the Psalms, he developed an interest in such translations, 
and later on was encouraged by Archbishop William Laud to translate the Psalms 
himself. Benson was a Whig politician, a wealthy architect and a literary critic, who 
wrote a biography of Johnston. His commitment as a Whig was decided. He 
published a letter attacking a Tory member of parliament of Swedish birth, Sir Jacob 
Bankes, for his advocacy of passive obedience to monarchs. The pamphlet, which 
got him into trouble with the Swedish ambassador and led to his being summoned 
before the Privy Council, became a very famous one and sold over a hundred 
thousand copies in different languages. 37 For the new edition of the Latin Psalms of 
Johnston (1741), he wrote his Prefatory Discourse that summarised his views about 
Johnston’s Psalms, comparing it with the work of Buchanan, and makes his points in 
favour of Johnston, whose writings and capacity he admired, especially for their 
sense of plainness.38 The Vindication of Ruddiman starts with an introduction 
addressed to Benson, criticising him for praising so highly a work (Johnston’s) that 
was certainly no better than that of Buchanan. 
In the first part, beginning from the introductory chapter, Ruddiman draws 
the framework, explaining his intensions in writing and his opinions about Benson 
and his writings, sincerely and with courtesy. In the opening sentences, Ruddiman 
praises Benson’s work and mentions his own great admiration for Johnston, frankly: 
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It was a very sensible pleasure to me, when I first heard that you had 
conceived so high an opinion of the poetical performances of our countryman 
Dr. Arthur Johnston, particularly of his paraphrase of the Psalms of David 
that you had determined to publish to the world a new and handsome edition 
of that part of his works. I was always a great admirer of that excellent author, 
and, as a testimony thereof, I caused [to] be printed, upwards of thirty years 
ago, his Paraphrase of the Song of Solomon, which it would seem he 
published …39 
However, these things, at the very beginning, might convey more than appreciation. 
Ruddiman, in this way, was able to mention immediately that he had enough 
acquaintance with Johnston to comment on his work. He declared himself to be a 
scholar who already knew a good deal of the value of Johnston, and so well able to 
offer criticism of Benson. At once, after his positive comments and declaration of his 
respect for both Benson and Johnston, he starts his criticisms, in the second 
paragraph. 
But, worthy Sir, you will forgive me to tell you, that when it afterwards 
appeared, that the extreme fondness you had conceived for our Dr. Johnston 
had transported you so far, as in a separate treatise to undervalue [Buchanan], 
in comparison of him … I frankly confess to you, I was not a little surprised. 
Another important passage comes immediately afterwards: 
Taste, I know, sir, is a very arbitrary thing; and it is almost incredible to what 
heights men, otherwise of great learning, have been carried, in their partial 
regards for some authors, to the disparagement of others, of as great and 
sometimes greater excellency than they. But as the truth of things is always 
the same, and cannot be in the least altered by the various opinions the most 
knowing men may possibly entertain concerning them; so it is to be wished 
that men would keep within due bounds, and not, by their ill-grounded 
prepossessions in favours of any writer, launch out into odious and slighting 
comparisons.40 
This passage can be examined in order to obtain a degree of knowledge about 
Ruddiman’s approach to scholarship and his ideas of a true literary standard. There is 
almost no doubt that Ruddiman’s views expressed here about the desirable kind of 
literary scholarship are his own. One can argue that he prefers certain discourses that 
                                                 
39 Ruddiman, Vindication, 1. 
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can fit into the general framework of the ongoing debate, or alternatively that he tries 
to support his stance and strengthen his arguments by making up grounds on which 
to justify his views. The quotation above more likely fits to the latter. However, 
leaving aside the criticism of Benson, Ruddiman’s general views emerge quite 
comprehensively and clearly. Primarily, from the very beginning, Ruddiman draws 
the distinction between his approach to the subject and that of Benson. Benson’s 
criticisms are generally oriented to the “taste” of the works, and thus his major 
criteria are aesthetics and the readability of the versions of the Psalms: 
Buchanan’s translation is a gaudy, pompous thing, with its outside show of a 
vast variety of metre; very fit to set the multitude of readers a staring, as the 
ornaments of majesty amuse the common people.41 
Ruddiman stresses his own definition and nature of “taste” and “opinion” in a quite 
clear way. He holds that, these are free and arbitrary grounds on which it is 
impossible to determine the true quality of a work. By saying this, he apparently 
criticises Benson’s pro-Johnston stance and blames him for a lack of a sense of 
objectivity. For Ruddiman, truth is always certain and there is no ground for opinion 
apart from that predetermined pattern of truth. In Ruddiman’s Vindication, it is 
clearly observed that the universal objective rules for criticism are mainly technical.  
Duncan, in his biography and criticism of Ruddiman, actually holds to this 
view, but criticises Ruddiman by drawing a distinction between Ruddiman and his 
contemporaries, by asserting the former’s failure to follow the patterns of the 
Enlightenment.42 Duncan’s criticism, as mentioned above, of Ruddiman’s late 
eighteenth-century biographer (Chalmers) as well, is mainly inspired by his own bias 
in favour of the principles of the Enlightenment.43 The bias is succinctly revealed in 
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one of the several comments of Duncan on the Enlightenment44 and the stance of 
Ruddiman: Ruddiman, he thought, contrasted very badly with his successor in his 
position in the Advocates’ Library of Edinburgh, David Hume, certainly a true figure 
of the Enlightenment.45 The point that Duncan puts forward is interesting as a 
remarkable approach towards Ruddiman. Duncan criticises Ruddiman for leaving the 
notions “taste” and “opinion” somewhat blurred. 
Taste being arbitrary, opinion being free, where were the absolute standards 
by which judgement could be formed, the certain principles from which true 
inferences could be drawn? It was important to thinkers of the Enlightenment 
to find such a standard and such a certainty.46 
In truth, Ruddiman was simply arguing that taste and opinion were often best left 
aside and that use be made of other kinds of criticism. The Enlightenment quest was 
unnecessary. Ruddiman can be criticised because of the use of rhetoric to assert his 
arguments and strengthen his propositions against those of his adversaries. However, 
one could hardly criticise him for not being aware of certain absolute and objective 
standards. He sets apart liking for an author or scholar on the one hand, and the rules 
of objective criticism on the other. Duncan also confirms that Ruddiman 
… conducts his argument according to objective rules of criticism, focussing 
his attention strictly on the Latinity of the two texts [of Johnston and 
Buchanan] and on the peculiar decorum required for the translation of the 
Holy Writ.47 
Duncan confirms that Ruddiman has a ground for objective criticism, chiefly the 
Latinity of both texts, though unhappy with what he considers his frivolous approach 
to taste and opinion. We may leave aside the question of whether Ruddiman always 
sticks to his own objective criteria in his studies. However, he has them, mentioning 
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at the beginning of one of his most laborious and longest works that “the truth of 
things is always the same.” This point is important for understanding Ruddiman’s 
scholarship and his rhetoric. Indeed, one may well come to different conclusions 
about Ruddiman, regardless of his political scholarship and rhetoric, by approaching 
him in other ways.48 In any case, his commitment to refrain from any 
“prepossessions in favour of any writer” is quite remarkable.49 
The introductory chapter of Ruddiman’s Vindication is mostly devoted to 
toning down Benson’s admiration for Johnston. Ruddiman, firstly, praises Johnston 
as “inferior to none, and superior to most of the age he lived in.”50 However, 
Ruddiman continues noting that Johnston also had imperfections and blemishes and 
to represent him as having achieved perfection would be raising him “upon the ruins 
of others.”51 There is an interesting element here in Ruddiman’s approach: his 
criticism of Johnston serves as a mirror of his criticism of Benson. A common 
method in debate, it is certainly favoured by Ruddiman, who constantly uses it to 
strengthen his arguments against his opponent.  
Despite his disapproval of both the character and doctrines of Buchanan, in 
his counter-argument, Ruddiman is clearly able to draw a distinction between his 
own sentiments about Buchanan and his literary criticism. 
For my own part, though there are several things that might more prepossess 
in favour of Dr. Johnston than Buchanan, (the freedoms I have on former 
occasions taken with this last, being sufficient to vindicate me from all 
suspicion of being biased towards him) yet, as every equitable judge ought to 
separate the consideration of the person from that of the cause, and as here the 
question is not concerning the moral, but the intellectual endowments of those 
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great poets, I shall, with all the impartiality and candour  I am capable of, 
endeavour to make it appear, that as your commendations of Dr. Johnston are 
too highly exaggerated, so the exceptions you make to Mr. Buchanan are for 
the most part trivial, and ofttimes without any foundation at all.52 
Moreover, continues Ruddiman: 
 
[B]efore I proceed, I must beg leave to premise, that as nothing, but an 
inviolable regard to truth, has engaged me to enter upon this dispute; so I 
shall make it my business to preserve all along that decency that becometh, 
by avoiding all injurious and reproachful language, which is but too common 
in such controversies.53 
In this way, Ruddiman restricts himself to the bounds of impartiality, from the 
beginning of this study. Ruddiman’s Vindication as an indication of ability in 
scholarly discourse, should be kept in mind in considering the debate with Logan. 
Clearly, Ruddiman’s view of Buchanan is nuanced. When the Whig historical 
tradition and the works of Presbyterian scholars and writers, as will be noted from 
considering Logan, is observed, the importance and the controversial characteristics 
of Buchanan will be very obvious. However, that Buchanan could leave this aside 
and that two different approaches by Ruddiman to Buchanan, one political and one 
scholarly, existed is acknowledged in modern studies.54 Ruddiman “admired 
Buchanan as a Latinist,” as William Ferguson remarks, understanding the learned 
printer’s view of one often acclaimed as the greatest of all Neo-Latin poets of the 
Renaissance. This commendation of Buchanan is clearer in the Vindication. The 
controversy between Ruddiman and Logan was exaggerated because of the intensity 
of the political tension in the years after the civil war of 1745-46. Ruddiman’s edition 
of Buchanan’s Opera Omnia, which “was scholarly but prone to set Buchanan in a 
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bad light”,55 aroused a great reaction from Whig Presbyterian circles, appearing at 
the time of the previous civil war. In the Vindication, he is trying only to restore 
esteem for Buchanan’s paraphrase of the Psalms, and sticks to the Latinity and the 
technical qualities of Buchanan. This attitude can barely be seen in his Vindication.56 
Other methods that Ruddiman uses for criticising Benson are somewhat 
peculiar to his Vindication, and can rarely be seen in his debate with Logan. 
However, there may be some useful point in mentioning them briefly. One instance 
is his attempt to set Benson apart from Johnston. He points out how much Johnston 
admired Buchanan. He carefully quoted a poem that Johnston quotes from Dr. 
Eglesham, an admirer of Buchanan.57 Ruddiman argues that if Johnston quoted a 
poem praising Buchanan, it also reflects Johnston’s own feelings about Buchanan. 
Another argument of Ruddiman against Benson is that the “faults and defects” of 
Buchanan were already known from his own work.58 Moreover, in his Vindication, 
Ruddiman successfully disciplines himself for approaching the study in three 
different respects. Firstly, he comments on whether or not the choice of verse form is 
appropriate. Secondly, he analyses the “justness” of the texts in expressing the 
meaning of the divine original. Finally, he focuses on the poetical expressions and 
ability displayed in both texts. From the beginning of his extensive study to the last 
chapter, he successfully remains faithful to his declared intentions. However, the 
greater part of the work consists of technical consideration of the skills of a Latinist. 
Additionally, Ruddiman is not unwilling to accept Buchanan’s imperfections. 
Though lacking a knowledge of Hebrew for measuring the accuracy of the Latin 
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translation of the Psalms, he sometimes criticises both Buchanan and Johnston for 
their inabilities to give the true meaning of the verses, by giving certain “[e]xamples 
where Johnston, and sometimes Buchanan, have mistaken or misapplied the words of 
the original.”59 What is best is the comparative approach to Johnston, using his own 
knowledge of Latin poetry.60 In his reaction to Benson, much evidence can be 
collected for acknowledging the quality of Ruddiman’s scholarship and his ability to 
act as Buchanan’s advocate.61 In contrast to his debate with Logan, which is 
observed in this study more thoroughly, Ruddiman’s counter-arguments to Benson 
have no political bias or purpose at all. Hence, the suitability of the Vindication to 
observe the actual scholarly attributes and Ruddiman’s mere scholarship can be 
obviously observed in his Vindication. 
Unlike Ruddiman, one cannot find Logan in debate with an individual, before 
his lively debate with Ruddiman. His various publications before this dealt mostly 
with ecclesiastical politics. It cannot be argued that Logan turned his direction 
towards politics after he started to produce works against Ruddiman, but he did 
produce many works for either justification of certain measures, or a political 
reorganisation of the Scottish Church. Generally speaking, one cannot separate 
religion and politics from each other in observing the intellectual environment of the 
eighteenth century, since there were few merely secular political inquiries in that 
century. Logan’s arguments concerning the way to be followed in electing and 
sending ministers to the vacant churches can be put side by side with his suppositions 
and historical inquiries on the true way of kingship and hereditary succession. Thus, 
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for drawing the framework correctly about the literary abilities, in both political and 
religious sense from today’s perspective, and success in rhetoric of Logan in 
comparison with those of Ruddiman, one has to evaluate his religious political 
philosophy together with his debating abilities. Therefore, along with one of his 
earlier works, his Inquiry (1732), the Treatise (1746) is again important for finding 
out how he handles a debate against an opponent.  
A Presbyterian thinker, Logan’s ability to comment on aspects of government 
of the Church of Scotland is significant. We may turn to his Inquiry, which does not 
promise more than various restatements of well-known positions. In this recitation 
and reflection on pieces from Holy Scripture, he successfully restricts his subject 
mainly around the reason and causes for the patterns of spiritual government and the 
principle of ius populi in the decision-making processes of the Church.62 In 
summary, there are three major points that Logan emphasises in his Inquiry. He cites 
certain necessities that should be followed for a just decision for the calling of 
ministers. Firstly, in the process of ministerial election the preferences of 
parishioners who are in the rank of mere hearers must not determine the outcome by 
themselves; so, they should be somehow excluded from the decision-making process. 
Secondly, and similarly, the people should not decide who are to be ordained to the 
ministry. Thirdly, he claims it was abundantly evident that in the history of the New 
Testament, Apostles elected pastors to the several churches, ordained and installed 
them in their office. However, Logan completes his argument by stressing the 
falseness of establishing a direct metaphor between those practices and contemporary 
practices, mentioning the necessity of proposing the ministers to the consent of the 
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wisdom of the Kirk session.63 To strengthen this argument, he cites Scripture as 
establishing a ground for congregations electing and choosing their own pastor. He 
thus acknowledges some fundamental validity in the popular case, in which it  
…is loudly said to be a Presbyterian principle, a principle of the Church of 
Scotland, and a Reformation principle; and this is contended for in our days 
with great warmth and keen zeal, in opposition to an act and overture of the 
last assembly, concerning the method of planting vacant churches; by which 
act is declared, that the planting of these parishes that shall fall into the hands 
of presbyteries tanquam jure devoluro, shall be by the heritors, being 
protestants, and the elders who represent the people. 64 
Logan was, of course, writing against the popular case, and thus emphasised clerical 
rather than lay power, declaring that  
the right of election belongs still to the Church Representative or the 
Presbytery; it is being reasonable to suppose that such an assembly has more 
learning, wisdom and prudence, than a congregation of illiterate persons, and 
are more able to judge of the abilities and qualifications of persons for the 
ministry, an election that is made with judgement and knowledge is surely to 
be preferred…65 
The actual disagreement here that Logan mentions, carefully and indirectly, is related 
to the difference between ius populi and ius populi divinum. Patronage had long been 
a source of conflict for the Church of Scotland. Logan successfully clarifies the 
distinction between the interference of laity through patronage to the decision-
making process of the Church, and the importance of the right of Church’s ministry 
and eldership in choosing new ministers.66 In defence of the latter, he offers various 
arguments. However, his ultimate solution is the preservation of the right of both 
Presbyteries and people to choose their ministers together, with certain restrictions 
for patronage.67 He was certainly for patronage, which provided the political and 
economic foundation of the Church. However, his emphasis is on clerical authority. 
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His careful interpretation of ius populi divinum comprehends the right of election, 
always within the framework of apostolic succession. 
Concerning ius populi principle, the right to choose ministers should belong 
to the congregation to a certain degree, a congregation that is regarded as being 
primarily composed of members of the elite. Balancing this is the ius populi divinum, 
is the right of judgement of the Presbytery to appoint a minister. Logan’s Inquiry is 
centred on and evolving around the checks and balances between ius populi and ius 
populi divinum, between the congregation and the assembly. Apart from Scripture, 
the source Logan mostly uses is The Two Books of Discipline (1561-1581), 
especially the First Book, both of which served as a standard for the ecclesiastical 
order in the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, and which was constituted upon the 
ground plan of John Knox on the Geneva model.68 
 The methodology of Logan in the Inquiry is quite successful in reaching the 
ends. He explains what is to be explained without much speculation, but with 
extensive references of the earlier and later sources. Especially, the long historical 
accounts and biblical passages in the third section of his work are fruitful pieces 
showing his ability to strengthen his arguments with intensive use of quotations, 
which comes to a conclusion on biblical precedents.69 The only speculation that can 
be found in the Inquiry is in his references to the issue of patronage and the pressure 
of the nobility on the congregation, with regard to the decisions of the session. He 
does not tackle very directly the issue of patronage, but rather conceals his support of 
the system of benefices and patrons. In any case, again, there is a system of checks 
and balances in the matter of benefices, in that “whensoever her Majesty, or any 
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other patron do present any person to a benefice, that the person presented should be 
tried and examined by the judgement of learned men” of the Church.70 Through the 
Inquiry, he seems to accept the contention that the right of election belongs to the 
people is a major Presbyterian principle, but asks how the truth about ius populi 
should be discovered, in order to “prevent confusion and mistakes.”71 He uses the 
Scripture to assert clerical power and support this with the practices of the Primitive 
Church and its canons. Finally, he considers similar practices in the Protestant 
churches after the Reformation. Although his arguments vary through the course of 
his Inquiry, he carefully argues from the form for appointing ministers as laid down. 
The ministers and elders at such time as there wanted a minister, assemble the 
whole congregation, exhorting them to advise and consider who may best 
serve in their room and office: and if there be choice, the Church appoints two 
or three upon some certain day to be examined by the ministers and elders. 
…and they [decide] whose gifts they found most meet and profitable for the 
ministry. …Then the minister that is to preach, [is] presented … to the church 
[the most suitable of them all] and then [the] afternoon the sermon being 
ended, the minister exhort[s] them to the election. …and after the election is 
over …he is appointed Minister. 72 
 
The right of electing ministers is shared by people and presbytery together, “by the 
judgement of the eldership and consent of the congregation.” 73 
Logan’s Inquiry, which mainly embraces the questions about the practices of 
the Church of Scotland on the issues of electing or desposing ministers, is a good 
source for understanding the identity between his political thought and his religious 
inquiries. His success in reconciling different and divergent demands, as observed in 
balancing landowner and clergy, is observed elsewhere in his study. His Inquiry is 
certainly a good reference for his emphasis on the extent of the rights of people in  
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choosing their political or spiritual rulers – a very limited extent it is – and his use of 
the sources and his practice of speculating on them. However, regarding his literary 
abilities and capability in rhetoric, both his Inquiry and his Treatises should be 
evaluated together. Logan’s Inquiry is a controversial tract around the issue of 
patronage, whether directly or not, given that it addresses the opponents of patronage 
in general. Since there is no debate with an individual in the Inquiry, one should look 
at his Treatise to see more clearly Logan’s abilities in debating and to note the 
parallelism between the arguments in the Treatise and the Inquiry. On the other hand, 
the Vindication allows readers to see a good piece of Ruddiman’s argumentation not 
mingled with political discourse and thus serves as a useful preview of his further 
publications. In addition, his literary criticism dealing with the “stuff of literature,” 
which is language and rhetoric, and often allows subjectivity, can also be utilised in 
examining political thought, which might well be considered an important part of the 
“stuff of history.”74 If “rhetoric” is a literary phenomenon, and “argument” is a 
historical one, the successful use of rhetoric in historical argumentations in both 
Ruddiman and Logan would be a blending of literary and historical disciplines.75 
Both Ruddiman and Logan might be accused of engaging in conflict with each other 
without solid bases, merely expressing ideological prejudices; but the slight 
difference between rhetoric and argumentation indicates the quality of their works, 
which are important pieces of argumentation about the dynastic history of Scotland, 
both medieval and early modern. There is, however, also a need to note that these 
two scholars and their works reflect the eighteenth century, a different environment 
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that cannot simply be criticised for its use of rhetoric and for differences of style, 
which may not meet the understandings and conventions of the following centuries. 
In eighteenth-century Scotland’s scholarly environment, the exact difference or 
intersection between literature and history is obscure and ill defined. Evaluation of 
the styles of both writers by anachronistic criteria will mislead. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE QUESTION OF HEREDITARY SUCCESSION:  
THE TWO TREATISES OF LOGAN 
 
 
 
Offering a general framework for the whole debate between Logan and 
Ruddiman will draw attention to the central matters and patterns of argument. As 
mentioned before,76 the three major points are the rival dynastic claims of Bruce and 
Balliol, the question of the legitimacy of Robert III, and the lineage of the Scottish 
kings. In brief, Logan defends revolutionary principles, but not strictly and steadily 
in accordance with Buchananite-Whig political thought. He firmly asserts the right of 
the people to take a position on high politics and confessional issues. This includes 
the people’s right to choose their own kings if necessity requires, and to determine 
who should be their ministers of religion. Even if his interpretation of these doctrines 
very much dilutes them, he is in a sense revolutionary, opening both the political and 
religious sphere to public opinion. He is, more or less, an advocate of Whig ideas, 
although in certain points he differs from the main lines of Whig political thought. 
These notions were countered by Ruddiman, who argued against any kind of 
revolution in any circumstances. He insists on the hereditary principle in the 
succession to the throne and a divinely ordained succession of bishops. Whiggism 
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and Presbyterianism unite, as do Jacobitism and Episcopalianism. At the climax of 
their disagreement on these main subjects, they both appeal to history. Ruddiman 
seeks to show with certain evidence that the succession to the throne of the Scottish 
kings had always been hereditary. Logan argues that the throne had obviously been 
regarded as elective on several occasions. They both try to clarify their points and 
cast light on the obscurities of their topics by exploiting medieval history. Generally 
speaking, on the issue of the rival claims of Bruce and Balliol to the Crown in the 
year 1291, and on the principle of succession among the Scottish kings of more 
obscure times, Ruddiman can be said to have had the “more difficult side to 
maintain.”77 However, Ruddiman is more successful in producing rhetorical 
arguments against the assertions of Logan on these very issues. Logan’s central issue 
is the problem of the legitimacy of Robert III, upon which Ruddiman wrote his 
Answer. Logan’s arguments on Robert III are sometimes weak in comparison to 
those of Ruddiman. Both parties seem careful to avoid from strictly religious issues. 
In other words, they do not engage in explicit theological argument. At most, their 
comments on those issues are mere statements of their positions. Though 
occasionally, there is a loss of courtesy, their debate is generally dignified, remaining 
firmly on the ground of dynastic history. 
III.1 First Treatise 
Logan published his first Treatise on the hereditary principle of the kingship 
of Scotland in 1746, under the patronage of Lord Somerville.78 His work was not 
only addressed to Ruddiman, but also to two other adversaries he considered in need 
of a reply. They were George Mackenzie (1630-1714), the third earl of Cromarty, a 
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Jacobite army officer of a distinguished family79 and one of the foremost Jacobite 
activists of the 1745 rising, and John Sage (1652-1711), a renowned Episcopal 
bishop and writer of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, known as “the 
Cyprianic Doctor.” From the first sentence of his book onwards, Logan 
straightforwardly cited his criticisms of indefeasible hereditary succession and 
accused those who differed of treason. The opinion that the right to the Crown of 
Scotland is by indefeasibly hereditary right was the propaganda of the “adherents and 
friends of the pretender to the Crown.” Since it was carefully propagated “among old 
and young, men and woman… with great success,” public opinion had changed in 
their favour. Consequently, 
[those] persons, who otherwise would have been good and peaceable subjects 
to King George, have their judgements greatly puzzled, and their consciences 
held in bondage about his right. Others are seduced into disaffection to his 
Majesty’s person and government, and have risen up in open rebellion…80 
Logan’s view of the matter doubtless indicates a certain truth about the importance of 
argument in this period, often overlooked by historians; but, of course, it was 
simplistic to go directly from public propaganda to an “open rebellion.” Jacobitism 
had a complex web of causes ending in rebellion. Logan might seem to restrict 
himself substantially to the central matter in political thought with regard to his 
opening explanation of the cause of Jacobitism. He does not assert that a complete 
explanation of Jacobitism is offered in his introduction. The political and intellectual 
bases of Jacobitism were various. His purpose in thus explaining Jacobitism, that the 
conspiracy derived from insistent propaganda is his own concern with historical 
argumentation. However, as Logan emphasised, public opinion was becoming a 
more important factor in politics in the period, in accordance with the changing 
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political and intellectual environment throughout Europe.81 We may see Logan’s 
choice as a reflection of this. 
Logan firmly asserted that there was no foundation in the Scottish 
constitution for an indefeasible hereditary right to the throne. In addition, he denied 
any divine constitution establishing hereditary monarchical government. A 
monarchical government can only be realised in the form of a civil government, as a 
form of that government “that men have established, agreeable to the dictates of right 
reason, so as to answer the valuable ends of it.” It was hardly possible that “God 
intended there should be a hereditary indefeasible succession of kings as His 
ordinance,” unless the kings are ordained “with hereditary wisdom, justice, 
goodness, and all other necessary qualifications for right administration of 
government.”82 Logan’s stress upon “civil government” and “reason” is very similar 
to that of the main lines of Whig thought. The idea that men are furnished with 
reason and capable of forming a civil government is most familiar John Locke, and 
his ideas on civil society,83 though Logan probably derives much from Buchanan. 
When Logan turned to Scotland, he of course maintained that the nation’s 
government was not by indefeasible hereditary right from the beginning. Rather, it 
was a sort of aristocratic government founded upon the consent of the chieftains and 
tribes in the days of Fergus I. The chieftains of the Scottish colonists sent for Fergus, 
because of his virtues, and elected him their king by unanimous vote.84 The event, 
narrated in detail by Logan, was the generally accepted Whig account on the origin 
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of the Fergusian monarchy, derived from Buchanan.85 Logan’s account of the 
Fergusian monarchy continues with Buchanan’s historical arguments, destructive of 
the absolute hereditary principle and succession by proximity of blood. Upon the 
death of Fergus I, Logan indicates,  
…his two sons being young, and unfit for the government, the magnates, i.e. 
the great men, laid down a plan for the succession, that it should not go by 
proximity of blood, but by ability and qualification for government; and 
accordingly Ferlegus, the eldest Son of Fergus, did not succeed, but 
Feritharis his father’s brother; and the foresaid law continued in force, till the 
days of Kenneth III.86 
Logan argues that until the reign of Kenneth III, succession to the throne of Scotland 
was elective and the only restriction to the throne was membership of the ruling 
dynasty. He does not press the point to require a choice between election and 
proximity of blood, but found Gaelic succession practices sufficient to defend what 
had taken place in 1689. Since the main argument is the right of the kings to the 
Crown being not strictly hereditary, Logan constructs his argument on the 
interruptions in the strict lineal succession. He strengthens his point that usurpations 
and cross-elections were the reality of the Scottish Crown. He argues that “ability 
and qualification for government” had been taken as the only measure to establish 
the legitimacy of a government, not mere “proximity of blood,” during the reigns of 
the first eighty kings – according to the list vouched for by Buchanan – from Fergus I 
to Kenneth III. The latter “abrogated this law, and made it [the Crown] successive in 
his family.”87 However, he also mentions that there was no very clear shift to the rule 
of strict hereditary succession from Kenneth III (the eightieth king) onwards either, 
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by giving the example of his heir, Constantine IV (the eighty-first king), who was the 
son of Culenus (the seventy-ninth king).88  
 Before continuing with Logan’s historical interpretations, resting on the Forty 
Kings doctrine, the problem of the unreliability of this Buchananite doctrine should 
be emphasised. It should be noted too that when, using data from various sources in 
arguing extensively on the lineage of his patron, Lord Sommerville, Logan 
eliminates or favours historical sources by referring to Buchanan’s accounts. In other 
words, Logan’s criterion of criticism of contemporary or earlier studies is whether 
they agree with the narrations of Buchanan or not. Here he also makes use of the 
esteem in which the poet and pamphleteer, William Drummond of Hawthornden 
(1585-1649), was held by seventeenth-century Royalists and eighteenth-century 
Jacobites. 
I chose to represent it [the reliability of data about the lineage of 
Sommerville] in the words of Drummond of Ha[w]thornden, because they 
confirm the narration of Buchanan, and our other historians; surely this 
celebrated historian and poet would not relate falsehood and scandal against 
the royal family, nor transmit to posterity such a heavy imputation, unless he 
thought it true in fact.89 
Although in eighteenth-century Scotland Buchanan’s historical 
interpretations, which were of canonical importance for Scottish Whigs like Logan, 
were well trusted, they were criticised by many scholars, notably James Anderson, 
Robert Fleming and Thomas Innes. The most influential of those who produced 
works criticising this legendary account of the Scottish past was Father Thomas 
Innes (1662-1744), writing in his historical inquiry, A Critical Essay on the Ancient 
Inhabitants of the Northern Parts of Britain (1729). His work was accepted and 
appreciated by many prominent scholars of his age, such as Francis Atterbury, 
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Thiery Ruinart, Archibald Campbell, Robert Keith, and Ruddiman himself. Duncan 
argues that Innes’s work brought a “spirit of calm French scepticism” to bear on the 
difficult-to-demolish belief in the Forty (non-existent) Kings inherited from medieval 
chroniclers by Buchanan.90 Innes stayed in France almost all his life, except for some 
visits to Scotland.91 He was among many scholars who produced criticism of “history 
stuffed with fables” and employed the “probable conjecture” in ancient studies.92 
After his influential Critical Essay, Enlightenment scholarship in Scotland became 
indebted to his approach. For instance, both Ruddiman and Logan seem to have 
agreed on the questionable character and the lack of reliability of Fordun’s chronicle, 
his Forty Kings doctrine in particular, and entertained a certain amount of suspicion 
about the first kings of Scotland.93 Nevertheless, thanks to the level of political 
tension, scholarship was subject to the politics of the period. Because of the 
consequential effects of historical inquiry, Innes’s critical approach did not quickly 
displace Buchanan’s. Logan, too, managed to ignore the arguments of his 
contemporaries on the reliability of the Forty Kings doctrine as a basis of 
constitutional theory, and stuck to Buchanan, a point that can be observed through 
the rest of this study, especially in discussion of Ruddiman’s answers and his Second 
Treatise. 
Logan’s assertion in his Treatise was that the succession had been interrupted 
every two or three generations for various reasons. Historically, he refers to certain 
chronological tables some of which were doubtful in touching the core of the matter. 
Logan chiefly used the chronological table licensed by Charles II for constructing his 
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argument. The other two sources for the hereditary line of the Scottish kings cited in 
his introduction are Oceana (1656), by James Harrington, the political theorist, and 
Collections concerning the Scottish History (1705) by James Dalrymple. Neither of 
these men were historians. Harrington’s Oceana was one of the most controversial 
works of his century, a heavy exposition of an ideal constitution centred on agrarian 
law, which was censored by Oliver Cromwell and never obtained widespread support 
from the political nation. On the other hand, Dalrymple’s work mainly concerns the 
jurisdiction of the Scottish Church. Significantly, Dalrymple is remembered for his 
pro-Union stance, and Whig politics and had moderate Presbyterian commitments.94 
Dalrymple’s argument concerning the elective monarchy, from one family, is 
directly borrowed by Logan, as he acknowledges in his work. Nevertheless, Logan 
gives this argument an extensive historical context, regardless of the doubtful 
reliability of the sources mentioned in the dedication. His main purposes in his work 
can be categorised under three main arguments. Firstly, he argues that the “eminent 
virtues” of some of the kings determined their succession to the throne regardless of 
their proximity of blood.  This argument, especially the phylarchical account of the 
Fergusian election, is an idealisation as if every succession by election was done with 
regard to the virtues of the heirs. The idealisation of election can also be found in the 
works of other Whig scholars, such as Rev. David Malcolme and William Jameson, 
who were following the Buchananite account of the Fergusian monarchy, as Logan 
did.95 Secondly, he mentions that bastards became kings with no hereditary right at 
all. Thirdly and finally, when the reigning king died without a male heir, females, 
who had the proximity of blood, were, despite this, isolated from the succession.96 
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These three points are given as the centre of his main argument that hereditary 
succession had been interrupted several times for various reasons. Apart from these 
major points, he pays special attention to the case of Robert Bruce and John Balliol 
on the hereditary right to the Scottish throne. This part of the study does serve 
Logan’s intentions; but his special interest in this subject is partly derived from the 
genealogy of his patron, Lord Somerville, with his ancestral ties with Bruce. A very 
detailed genealogical study of the ties of the Somerville family to Bruce can be found 
in the dedication of the Treatise.97 The presence of this interest in a noble family 
should be noted; but it hardly dominated this influential piece of anti-Jacobite 
scholarship. 
In comparing the intellectual ability and rhetoric of the two scholars, 
Ruddiman and Logan, we see that the fundamental matter that relates to Jacobite 
ideology is a historical quest of Logan to make clear the ius regni and its operation. 
Primarily, Logan opposes the arguments of the Jacobites on absolute and 
indefeasible hereditary monarchy. From the first page of his Introduction onwards, 
Logan draws a broad and well-defined legal and historical framework. He constructs 
his argument about the constitution on his argument about the history of the 
dynasties. For example, to the origin of the discussion, he successfully grasps the 
core argument expressed in his first fundamental opposition to the Jacobite 
understanding of the dynastic history: briefly, he discredits the Jacobite claims that 
the law of Kenneth III had restored the ancient hereditary monarchy with all its 
principles, which was rightfully still to continue. Logan argues that even Kenneth’s 
son did not succeed him, and this was only one of various examples he went on to 
offer. This is a deconstruction of the Jacobite arguments on the ius regni. Apart from 
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this major objection concerning the filial succession after Kenneth III, Logan gives 
various examples of interruptions of the strict hereditary succession in the royal line, 
like the preference for adult uncles over minors, bastards’ successions, and exclusion 
of daughters from the throne. So, Kenneth’s revival of the Fergusian tradition was 
not a restoration of the fundamental ius regni, but a repeal of the law without 
considering the limitations of kingship. This historical rejection of absolute 
hereditary right, in the discussion of Kenneth III, was a definitive way of refuting 
Jacobite claims.98 
Logan’s counter-arguments in his Treatise addresses certain Jacobite 
pamphlets ready to defend the right of the House of Stuart to the Crown of Scotland. 
These pamphlets were produced in order to argue against Whig tracts which showed 
…the inexpediency of altering the present settlement of the Crown in the 
illustrious house of Hanover, in favour of the Pretender (…) the arguments 
and topics advanced in them, give full satisfaction to Whigs: but as for the 
Jacobites, who stiffly contend for the absolute, indefeasible, hereditary right 
of the Kings of Scotland and England, there is no convincing of them, unless 
it be shown that there is no foundation for such a right, in the constitution of 
these kingdoms, or in the law of nature, or in any positive law recorded in the 
holy scriptures…99 
Logan’s intention in his Treatise is to show that the “Pretender’s” right to the throne 
has no foundation in the constitution of the Kingdom of Scotland. The quotation 
above is from a passage of Logan refuting a particular pamphlet of one of his 
contemporaries whose name is not mentioned in the Treatise.  
He starts his treatise by mentioning, at the very beginning, the pamphlet, The 
Right of the House of Stewart to the Crown of Scotland (1746), of Alexander Tait, a 
member of the Select Society (act. 1754-1764), an Edinburgh debating club for 
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socially prominent members of the intellectual elites of the city.100 Dealing with the 
issue of indefeasible hereditary succession, Logan’s argument centres on the 
interruptions in the hereditary succession. He asserts that, from the succession of 
Robert Bruce, from whom the Stuarts were descended, there was no absolute 
hereditary right of the House of Stewart to the throne. The better hereditary right 
belonged to John Balliol. Indeed, he does not reveal his own ideas about the 
succession, arbitrating between Bruce and Balliol. Rather, he prefers to recite 
historical events and speak of a constitutional phenomenon deducible from them: that 
proximity of blood did not necessarily prevail. Logan tells the sequence of events 
after the death of Margaret, the Maid of Norway, grand-daughter of Alexander III 
(1241-1286), who died without a male heir, as the origin of the conflict between 
Bruce and Balliol. As the clear successor, there was David, Earl of Huntington. The 
claims put forward by John of Scotland (Balliol) and Robert the Bruce rested on their 
kinship with David of Huntington. Balliol’s claim was that he was the eldest son of 
Dornagilla, daughter of Margaret of Huntington, who was the eldest daughter of 
David of Huntington. On the other hand, Bruce claimed that he was the eldest son of 
Isabel of Huntington, of the second daughter of David. Bruce’s claim to the throne 
was according to proximity of blood, whereas Balliol’s claim rested on 
primogeniture and was stronger since successions for about two hundred years had 
been by the law of the first-born. 
After giving this panorama, Logan continues with the sequence of events, 
which ended in the decision of Edward I, king of England, in favour of Balliol for the 
crown of Scotland. Logan’s interest in the decision of Edward I is about the “custom 
of Scotland” of choosing the claimant by primogeniture, the law of succession 
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favouring the first-born to the throne.101 Logan mentions the question about Bruce 
and Balliol, and the theories of hereditary succession, in that respect, for asserting 
that the hereditary succession is neither determined by proximity of blood, nor by 
primogeniture. Staying away from supporting any of the claims for the throne, and 
any justifications by primogeniture or proximity of blood, his only intention is to 
show that the succession in Scotland was not strictly hereditary. Therefore, he 
focuses on the sequence of events after Edward I interfered in the cause, and 
particularly after the decision was taken in favour of Balliol.  
The obscurity attending the Great Cause produced a power vacuum that 
allowed grounds for the interference of Edward I, inserting a claim of overlordship 
into the competition for the throne of Scotland. Simply, the competition for the 
throne reached such a level of tension that Edward I, who sought increased influence 
in the affairs of Scotland, stepped in and seized the opportunity to gain something he 
had long wanted – recognition that the crown of Scotland was held as dependant on 
the crown of England, though uninvited to arbitrate by any of the claimants. As a 
politically motivated arbitrator, Edward I, in 1292, organised a court of Scottish 
aristocrats who would decide among the claimants on the right to the throne. The 
court took a decision in favour of Balliol, whose claim rested on the rule of 
primogeniture. Balliol was, indeed, in a more advantageous position, since 
primogeniture had been used in Scotland for some two hundred years, whereas Bruce 
was asserting the nearness of generation, significant according to the “ancient Celtic 
method;” and that was not unimportant either.102 
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Logan’s argument is a series of comments on the constitutional law of the 
hereditary monarchy, especially referring to the different practices of primogeniture 
and tanistry. At the end of his introduction, he briefly mentions that hereditary 
monarchy, according to some scholars, 
…is that which descends from father to son by the right of primogeniture; and 
failing a son, the succession is to go to the next male-heir, to the exclusion of 
a daughter. And thus it obtains in France by the salique law. But according to 
others, hereditary monarchy is that which descends by proximity of blood, 
whether this proximity be in a son or a daughter; and so the succession goes 
in Britain, and so it went in Queen Mary’s time in Scotland.103 
Logan’s Treatise is a scholarly inquiry. He neither favours tanistry, a system 
of life tenure whereby the succession was granted by election upon the eldest and 
worthiest among the surviving relatives of the deceased lord,104 nor condemns the 
succession according to primogeniture. He only argues that succession might be 
either by primogeniture or by tanistry, flexibly, and that there had been no strict and 
indefeasible hereditary succession to the Scottish throne. By using this argument, he 
could avoid theory, but state his Whig position and his own point of view, and use 
historical data to prove it. By the decision of the court of Edward I, Balliol was 
adjudged to be king: 
…[b]ut Balliol not long after falling out with Edward, and being overcome by 
him, the estates of Scotland revived Bruce’s title, and in a convention held at 
A[y]r, anno 1315, declared Robert (the grandson of that Robert Bruce, who 
had competed with Balliol) king. He got into the throne even while Balliol 
was alive…105 
Indeed, Bruce became king, as Balliol did, because of the circumstances of the day. 
Neither Bruce nor Balliol can be said to have had an irrefutable claim according to 
the constitution. Balliol as been elected by primogeniture, with the negative point 
that he de facto admitted Edward I as his feudal superior. Again, for Bruce, if he had 
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a right according to proximity of blood and the importance tanistry, he nevertheless 
accepted Plantagenet suzerainty.106 The elective capacity of the court can be doubted 
too. Logan’s stance concerning this problem can be said to be impartial to a certain 
degree. He only focuses on this historical problem, which in itself he has no concern 
to settle, to prove the irregularity of the succession. A strict and indefeasible 
primogeniture was not present. Logan again uses this historical assertion to attack the 
Jacobite argument on behalf of the uninterrupted hereditary succession.   
Edward having, according to the custom of Scotland in other heritages, 
determined in favour of Bal[l]iol, all the kings descending from Bruce, must 
have been usurpers, as wanting the hereditary right, or they mounted the 
throne on the principles of the Revolution, viz. that it is in the power of the 
estates or parliament to alter, fix, and limit the succession.107 
The argument, simply showing that there cannot be only one principle in the 
constitution by which a claimant should be granted the throne in the constitution, in 
Logan’s Treatise was used elsewhere in the treatise to establish other possible 
grounds for succession. By referring to history and by establishing a successful 
reasoning between events and constitutional phenomena, he is capable of drawing a 
framework freed from explicit appeal to the Buchananite ius regni and the elective 
ius populi. The only thing he does is to put the relevant historical data into the correct 
place in his work. This does give his work a level of interest and readability, which 
sometimes dissolves in his later works. Nevertheless, in his Treatise, there are 
various general arguments that there had never been a strict hereditary monarchy and 
an uninterrupted continuation of government in the world, in the sense Jacobites 
believed. Some of the examples were from very early times. 
Monarchy, is the government of one man over a great body of people, or 
numerous subjects. These who are for the patriarchal scheme… make Adam 
the supreme civil governor or monarch of the world, as long as he lived, 
which was 930 years, and Noah, for the space of 350 years after the Flood: 
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but after him, they are obliged to own, that the empire of kings was not so 
extensive; for tho’ the Assyrian, Persian, Grecian and Roman monarchies 
were very large, and were called universal, and particularly the Roman 
Empire… Yet, in strict propriety of language, they were no more universal, 
than the King of Spain can be properly called a Catholic King, or the Church 
of Rome the Catholic Church. The Roman Empire came to be divided into 
eastern and western, and then afterwards lesser Governments sprung out of 
them. The government of Scotland was, and now of Great Britain, is 
monarchical.108 
Logan had the necessary talent and the ability in rhetoric to produce 
counterarguments against the Jacobite thinkers. However, in the Treatise, one can 
hardly find any salvos or long passages of polemic. His work is mainly composed of 
modest argumentation that cannot be used to extreme ends: it is hardly possible 
either to find an argument that could favour popular election or come across a 
passage that could legitimise king-killing doctrines. Logan’s argument is about the 
relationship of an elite to the monarchy. 
 A striking passage at the very beginning of Logan’s Treatise is a courtesy to 
Ruddiman, mentioned by name, speaking of his valuable contributions to the study 
of Buchanan. The work which Logan appreciated is Ruddiman’s previously 
examined work with comments on Benson’s English paraphrase of Johnston’s 
Psalms, comparing Johnston’s work with that of Buchanan, in favour of Buchanan. 
[A]nd here with gratitude I must acknowledge, that I have been greatly 
instructed in a good many things by his [Ruddiman’s] writings; and 
particularly by the valuable present he honoured me with, of his 
unanswerable defence of Buchanan’s paraphrase of the Book of Psalms, from 
the objections raised against it, by William Benson, Esq; in which, upon a 
comparison of the performances of Mr. Buchanan and Dr. Arthur Johnston, 
he demonstrates the Superiority to belong to Buchanan. But as to the 
hereditary right of the kings of Scotland, in the strict sense, I cannot be of his 
mind; it is his favourite opinion, of which he is so excessively fond (he will 
forgive me) that he has fallen into several mistakes, not wilfully, I am 
persuaded, but by taking too many things upon trust, without due 
examination, and relying upon a train of high flying writers in his 
annotations.109 
                                                 
108 Ibid., 8. 
109 Ibid., 11. 
 50
 Logan and Ruddiman, representing conflicting parties in a scholarly debate, 
neither brought forward contradictions over facts nor did they ignore each other. 
Buchanan’s works constituted major source for both camps, from which both Logan 
and Ruddiman borrowed something.110 In fact, there was no problem about the 
sources for interpretation; but there was the matter of how to interpret it. Moreover, it 
was not their literary and scholarly abilities in writing history, but their motivations, 
that complicated matters in the tense environment of the mid-eighteenth century. 
Partisanship and political passion on both sides resulted in interpretation of the same 
sources in different ways. It can be also asserted that the tension, which produced 
this partisanship, between the Whigs on one side and Jacobites on the other, was 
added to, to some extent, by the atmosphere of after the Forty-Five Rebellion.111 
The most significant and probably, still arguably, the most important thing in 
the Treatise is that Logan provides a new interpretation of Buchanan, trying to free 
him from any sort of radicalism. Buchanan’s political views, especially those relating 
to kingship, needed to be adapted to the intellectual environment of the eighteenth 
century. As a Gallicised Scot, Buchanan reflects the Huguenot thought of his age, 
apart from certain differences in relation to lex regia, on the character of legitimacy 
in political society. Besides, Buchanan’s radicalism is revealed in that he asserts that 
the people merely delegate their authority to a king, whose status is not the same of 
an absolute sovereign, a maior universis and legibus solutus, but “is rather that of a 
minister who remains minor universis and in consequence bound by the positive laws 
of the commonwealth.”112 Generally speaking, Buchanan’s “king” is extremely 
restricted by the bounds of constitutional law. He is also required to be a man of 
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outstanding virtue – and may somehow resemble Plato’s “philosopher-king” or 
Aristotle’s “one best man”. In addition, the “king”, who is a “law-speaking silent 
king,” should be subject to popular will.113 Buchanan tended to reduce the king to a 
position with no clear judicial and governmental function. Logan’s main concern, in 
explaining Buchanan, is to affirm that he demonstrated that the Scottish monarchy 
was neither an elective monarchy dependant to popular support, nor a strictly 
hereditary monarchy, but was something between the two.114 Without referring to the 
Buchananite theory of resistance, Logan starts his argument by explaining 
Buchanan’s account of the choice of Fergus I, where he points out the determination 
of the chiefs of the Scottish clans for the coronation of Fergus. Simply, Logan makes 
the distinction clear between the “people” who elect the king, and the “chiefs of the 
people”, the optimates, the primores who made Fergus I king.115 Buchanan use the 
term “the suffrages of the people,” according to Logan’s interpretation of him, for 
referring to the consent of the “representatives” of the people. Thus, he makes an 
important reinterpretation of Buchanan’s constitutional theory, and perhaps a 
clarification of his ideas. It is also possible to argue that Buchanan reduced the power 
of the royal office to something resembling that of the doge of Venice. Thus, it 
would be considered as a mere practical institution.116 Logan is not at that extreme 
either. He was a founding member of the Associated Critics society, which was 
established to defend the reputation of Buchanan against Ruddiman and Freebairn. 
Here, he was trying to defend the reputation of Buchanan by reinterpreting his views, 
and modifying them into less provocative ideas on the kingship in Scotland. The two 
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main aims in the Treatise, in dealing with Buchanan’s political views, are firstly to 
rescue him from those who criticised him on the grounds of hostility to hereditary 
monarchy and support for popular resistance, and, in the final analysis, to defend the 
Scottish Whig tradition. Moreover, his tradition was required to be a suitable vehicle 
of loyalty to the Hanoverian establishment.117 That hardly suggested the defence of 
Buchanan’s radicalism. 
 Logan can be criticised for avoiding or obscuring some aspects of Buchanan’s 
theory of resistance.118 Furthermore, he argues that Buchanan did not actually favour 
a strictly elective method of succession to the throne. In Logan’s interpretation, 
Buchanan’s history showed that Scotland was neither a purely elective nor a purely 
hereditary monarchy.119 Logan devotes a considerable part in his work to describe 
the period from Fergus I to Fergus II, and thus for mentioning the interruptions in the 
royal line.120  
In the Treatise one can come across many instances when Logan switches 
form one topic to another, not inconsistently, but producing a certain amount of 
confusion in terms of the readability and thoroughness of the text. This is because he 
devotes long passages including long quotations from various sources – books, 
speeches in parliament, poems, sermons, articles and pamphlets – that constitute 
nearly the half of the Treatise, for refuting and deconstructing the Jacobite arguments 
about the disputed points in the dynastic history of Scotland.121 However, the 
discussions related to his argumentation, with their many direct quotations and 
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substantial footnotes with long Latin passages, are related to his central points, do not 
significantly distract the reader; rather, they make it a more fruitful and entertaining 
study. In addition, his main points are not lost: one can look at his brief explanation, 
where he puts forward historical proof providing reasonable grounds for refuting 
Jacobite assertions. In order to make his argument safer, since the period from Fergus 
I to Fergus II was doubtful, especially in the light of Innes’s Critical Essay,122 he 
offers a short outline of what happened after Fergus II down to Robert Bruce, a 
clearer scene for Logan’s inquiries, into interruption of the hereditary line: 
I shall now show from Fergus II down to Robert Bruce, there have been many 
interruptions of the hereditary lineal succession. Congallus I did not succeed 
his father Dongardus, till Constantine I had reigned full 22 years. Aidanus did 
not succeed his father Goranus, till Eugenius III and Congallus II and 
Kinnatillus had amongst them reigned full 35 years. Eugenius IV did not 
succeed his father; but Kenneth I did. Mulduinus did not succeed his father 
Donald, till Donald’s brother had reigned more than 17 years. Eugenius VI 
did not immediately succeed his father Ferchard; but the reigns of Malduine 
and Eugenius V did intervene. Murdacus did not immediately succeed his 
father, but Eugenius VII did, who reigned 17 years. Etsinus did not 
immediately succeed his father Eugenius VII till Murdacus had reigned 15 
years. Achaius did not succeed his brother Fergus III till Solvathius had 
reigned full 19 years. Alpinus did not succeed his father Achaius, till 
Congallus, Achaius’s father’s brother’s son, and Dongallus the son of 
Solvathius, had between them reigned eleven years. Constantine II did not 
succeed his father Kenneth II but Donald V did. Malcolm I did not succeed 
his father Donald VI but Constantine III did. Duffus did not succeed his 
father Malcolm immediately, but Indulphus did. Constantine IV did not 
immediately succeed his father Culenus, but Kenneth III did. Malcolm II did 
not immediately succeed his father Kenneth, but the reigns of Constantine IV 
and Grimus did intervene. Malcolm Kenmoir did not succeed his father 
Duncan I but MacBeth did. Edgar did not succeed his father, till the reigns of 
Donald VII and Duncan II did intervene.123 
Such straightforward accumulation clearly strengthened his argument. After giving 
enough such historical proof, he cites his sources: 
My vouchers, for the above account of the Succession of our kings, are the 
table of the kings of Scotland, printed with Sir John Skeen’s edition of the 
acts of Parliament, Sir Thomas Murray’s chronological table, licensed by 
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Charles II printed anno 1681. These two tables agree in omnibus… and lastly 
Mr. Ruddiman’s own table prefixed to his edition of Buchanan’s History.124 
Logan then offers his final historical evidence against indefeasible 
succession, seeking to prove that there had never been a direct hereditary succession 
continuo in genere proximos, freed from violations of principle. He gives a long list 
of usurpations and bastards in the hereditary line, in the same way he had given the 
list of interruptions.125 He also criticises the patriarchal scheme, especially as stated 
by Ruddiman, for giving the hereditary right to the male heirs only. He here refers to 
Scriptures, and especially focuses on the Old Testament.126 The important point here 
is that Logan does not offer a theoretical criticism of the patriarchal theory, but rather 
he tries to use their defence of Queen Mary of Scots. Of course, Buchanan had been 
a notable opponent of the queen. Logan devotes long passages,127 including 
discussion of the arguments of John Knox and French Salic law, reminding the 
Jacobites of their attacks on Buchanan on the matter of the government of women. 
However, Logan manages to keep the appearance of disinterested scholarship on the 
matter of government by women: 
There are some few instances of the government of women that have proved 
to be a blessing and happiness to a nation, as Queen Elisabeth to England, and 
Queen Anne to Britain; yet it is certain, that the arguments against g[y]narchy 
are so strong, and the inconveniencies attending it are so many…128 
Such moderation in argument can be again observed in his quotation from 
Buchanan, giving an account on the reputed bastardy of Robert III, referring the 
series of events involving Robert’s partners Elisabeth Mure and Euphemia Ross. 
Logan does not use this account merely to support his thesis; rather, he puts 
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Buchanan’s views and Ruddiman’s comments side-by-side, and explains to the 
reader the problem with Ruddiman’s criticisms. Ruddiman’s annotations declared 
that Buchanan’s “whole narration concerning Robert’s wives and children, is a 
collection of lies badly put together.” 129 Frequently, Logan selects passages from 
Buchanan that include serious historical arguments, which he juxtaposes with the 
reactions of Ruddiman to them, which are immoderate and inequitable. 
 Many pages of the Treatise are devoted to the question of the bastardy of 
Robert III. However, the material on this is scattered by Logan, and no systematic 
discussion can be found.130 He criticises Ruddiman’s Annotationes in Historia of 
Buchanan for the unreliability of his sources and evidence,131 focuses on the 
questions on the papal right to dispense marriages,132 and relates it to the question of 
Elisabeth Mure’s marriage,133 points out the differences between different editions of 
Sir George MacKenzie’s Jus Regium, offers the full-text Latin version of the 
parliamentary act in 1371 for vindicating Robert III’s legitimacy, shows the material 
and temporal errors of Ruddiman.134 Logan confuses the reader, talking about 
different and divergent issues as if they were complements of each other. Therefore, 
it becomes difficult to understand the whole picture from his scattered arguments. 
The most interesting point he makes is a religious one, to put forward to claim 
the immorality of papal approval of the marriage of Robert II to Elisabeth Mure, 
Robert III’s mother. 
The Bishop of Rome, and his pretended delegate the Bishop of Glasgow had 
no just power to dispense with a consanguinity forbidden by the divine law… 
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[though] Pope of Rome has assumed such a power to dispense with the law of 
God, as to making of marriages within the degrees forbidden by the law of 
God.135 
Logan appeals to Ruddiman: 
…in this, I hope Mr. Ruddiman will agree with me… [and] will not deny: If 
there was a dispensation granted by the Pope, that Robert might marry a 
woman within the forbidden degrees, no power upon earth, whether 
ecclesiastical or civil, had a right to grant it…136 
  
Logan’s attempts on the matter of Robert III’s reputed bastardy appear 
decidedly weak as a piece of anti-Jacobite argumentation. Duncan thought little of 
Logan’s treatment of the matter of Robert III in general. He disliked the mere 
moralizing and found it ineffective. However, Logan’s points are not without some 
rhetorical merit.  Firstly, by claiming that the papal action had been against the 
divine law, Logan is able to use anti-Catholic belief and sentiment in a historical 
discussion of the Stuarts, in other words, to call on the core of anti-Jacobite 
sentiment. Secondly, Logan, lacking the ability to substantiate his case using relevant 
historical evidence, offered a mere expression of moral sentiment – a prudent action 
– when the opposing side in the debate was stronger in historical proof. Lastly, 
Logan in addressing Ruddiman, indicates expectation of general approval of his own 
moral attitude – describing the papal action as a willingness “to give licence to sin, 
nay, to live in a state condemned by God.”137 Logan may have hoped to induce the 
Episcopalian Ruddiman to yield to an anti-Catholic moral position or, at least, be 
distracted from the historical strength of the Jacobite position on this topic by moral 
argumentation. In any case, with the tack Ruddiman took, noted later in this study, 
Logan was not criticised for his personal comments on the issue of the bastardy of 
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Robert III, but because of his sources, especially his use of Buchanan, and judged on 
a matter of historiography.  
The method Logan followed in this matter was not always constant. There 
was his moralistic approach, mentioned above; but generally, he preferred to produce 
argumentation on historical sources and accounts. 
Mr. Ruddiman maintains, with some late writers since the year 1680, to wit, 
the Earl of Cromarty, Sir George Mackenzie, Mr. Sage, George Crawford and 
others, that Elisabeth Muir was Robert’s first wife[.] Upon the other hand, I 
assert with our historians, that lived nearest to the reign of Robert II, to wit, 
Boethius, [John] Major, [Charles] Lesly, Buchanan, and Ha[w]thornden, 
Scottish historians; and [Raphael] Hollinshed, [Robert] Saunderson, English 
historians; Sir John Skeen and Sir Thomas Murray, two of our celebrated 
lawyers, that Eu[ph]em[ia] Ross was Robert’s first wife, none of which was 
ever suspected to have a turn to serve by th[e]ir narrations, but George 
Buchanan…138 
As indicated, Logan’s style of refuting Ruddiman exphasises rejection of 
Ruddiman’s authorities, used to oppose him in both of the treatises. He does, of 
course, lack precision and accuracy in this. His Second Treatise, too, includes large-
scale refutation of Ruddiman’s authorities, serving to refute Ruddiman’s  prefaratory 
notes to Buchanan’s Opera Omnia. 
 In summary, Logan’s major purpose in his Treatise is to deny any 
‘indefeasible’ feature of hereditary succession. The Treatise can be regarded, noting 
its shortcomings in narrative and rhetorical competence, as a serious scholarly work, 
neither advocating a perfectly civil government, established merely by parliamentary 
legitimacy nor a divine-right monarchy with strict hereditary succession, but 
something in between. Besides, although a Whig, he did not maintain a clear 
Lockean or Buchananite position: he certainly did not advocate an elective 
monarchy, but argues merely for a possibility of slight regulation of the law of 
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succession. His main idea developed through his work, was that the Scottish law of 
succession could, have a certain degree of flexibility for tolerating unusual 
circumstances, within a hereditary framework. 
III.2 Second Treatise 
 Logan’s published A Second Treatise on Government in 1747, a year after he 
published his first, before any comprehensive criticism of his work came from 
Ruddiman. So, to some extent, this treatise was a continuation of the first, and an 
attempt to strengthen its arguments, by filling the gaps in the argumentation on 
certain topics, such as the question of the bastardy of Robert III. Although Logan’s 
Second Treatise is not an answer to Ruddiman, it was a reaction to many pamphlets 
and letters, and these included attacks on Logan for his first Treatise. On the other 
hand, in characterising the Second Treatise, we may say that it is neither a short 
answer to adversaries, known and anonymous, nor a longer, enhanced version of the 
first Treatise. Although the two books are approximately the same in length, the 
second work runs to 140 pages without appendices, and has the character of a 
continuation of the original Treatise. The Second Treatise covers much the same 
ground as the first, broadening aspects of it. It can hardly be appraised as an 
independent study, as carefully produced as the first one, which constitutes an 
important anti-Jacobite scholarly inquiry. Logan himself declares that his main 
purpose in producing the Second Treatise is to complete argumentation of what he 
said against the strictness of the hereditary right to the crown of Scotland.139 The 
driving force of the second work are Logan’s anger at the anonymous letters 
criticising his anti-Jacobite treatise and his enthusiasm to prepare and finish his work 
before Ruddiman published a refutation. 
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…being apprised of Mr. Ruddiman’s intention of making a reply to my first 
treatise on government; I would in this, which is a continuation of the former, 
give him a full view of what I have to say against the pretended hereditary 
right to the crown of Scotland, in a strict sense.140 
He declares his keenness to get a response from Ruddiman:  
…I desired the publisher, after my first sheet was cast off the press, to send it, 
with my compliments to him [Ruddiman], and to do in like manner with the 
following sheets, till he should have the whole performance: hereby I have 
laid myself open; but having acted such a candid, but uncommon part, he has 
all advantages, veritas non querit latebras, and I contend not for victory, but 
for truth. As yet I have not heard from Mr. Ruddiman himself; nor have I 
received one sheet of a reply, tho’ his was in the press before this; but I make 
no question of having the favour of a present with the first.141 
This is a crucial point. The character of the Second Treatise derived from the urgency 
Logan felt to address Ruddiman fully before he published his answer; and this made 
it a better study, if we leave out the emotional expressions and distractingly negative 
tone of the introduction. With regard to the improvement of the Second Treatise, in 
comparison with the first, one can observe that there are fewer direct quotations 
running to several pages, less confusion in argumentation, more successfully 
shortened explanations, and a very useful table of all the kings of Scotland with 
concise historical accounts of their successions and reigns.  
 Logan’s Second Treatise is dedicated to Lord Andrew Fletcher of Milton 
(1691/2- 1766), judge, one of the senators of the College of Justice in Edinburgh. 
The dedication of the book is instructive, offering a nearly complete summary of the 
purpose and context of the whole work. The important points are as follows. Firstly, 
at the beginning, he notes that the reliability of the charters, which had been used in 
inquiries into the nature of the Scottish constitution, is doubtful. As an example, he 
mentions that the public registers, which include charters of constitutional interest, 
had been subject to partial reproductions and replacements, noting especially that 
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they are incomplete – and the consequences, the reduction of their dependability and 
confusion. Logan notes that the public registers from the reign of King Robert I to 
that of King James I, especially Codex Davidis and the rolls of Robert II contain 
“defects and nullities”, which he discovered in the course of his own writing. We 
cannot easily decide what Logan’s implicit intentions, if any, are by mentioning this 
matter. Logan, at the very beginning, might merely have wanted to state that there is 
no flawless primary source for the study of the history of the Scottish constitution by 
him or by other scholars. The task was a difficult one. If Logan was seeking to 
strengthen his hand against Ruddiman, he was pointing out that Ruddiman referred to 
the same sources as he did. He was pointing out that the argument was open to 
distortion, and he had confidence in his own ‘credit’ – as it was put in the period – 
his reputation for honesty. However, more reasonably, it can be asserted that Logan’s 
remarks about the omitted words and sentences, the inconsistencies in dates in 
comparison to the originals of the charters, page confusions, lost passages, and all 
other defects in the registers serve only to convince the reader of the scholarly 
character of his Second Treatise.142  
In his second point in the Dedication, Logan clarifies the difference between 
“next heir” and “next in proximity of blood” with the simplest and most 
unsophisticated examples, paraphrasing his complicated explanations about 
hereditary succession found in his first Treatise. However, that simple explanation, 
distinguishing the right of the eldest son of a king from the right of other members of 
the dynasty, serves to confirm Logan’s criticism of the former principle. This 
provided support to for justification of the ius divinum. He offered the example of the 
reign of James VI. He emphasised the absolutism practiced in the reign. Arbitrariness 
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in succession, by proximity of blood, influenced the whole system and encouraged 
the “slavish doctrines of non-resistance and passive obedience… given out to be law 
by courtiers”. Supporting doctrines of ius divinum, primogeniture allowed “many 
acts to mancipate the liberties and persons” of the subjects and bring them “to their 
[government’s] devotion and service”. The example he gives is a short passage from 
a declaration of Parliaments in 1685 in favour of James VII, a declaration that it 
“firmly resolve[d] to give entire obedience to his majesty without reserve”.143 
Next, the Dedication indicates that he intends to use the phrase “limited 
monarchy” and the word “liberties” more extensively than he had previously. This is 
particularly appropriate, as the uncle of Logan’s patron was the famous Andrew 
Fletcher of Saltoun (1653-1716), whose speeches and political works in support of 
Whiggish Scottish patriotism mainly centred on the notion of liberty. Logan declared 
that the name of Fletcher had strong connotations of liberty, and that Fletcher of 
Saltoun’s “darling principles were a limited monarchy and the liberties of the 
people”.144  
Next, he speaks of the invaluable nature of Buchanan’s “unanswerable book,” 
De Iure Regni, in support of “the happy revolution establishment, the limited power 
of the prince and the liberties of the people.” He attacks all those who do not favour 
these principles, especially the Jacobite intellectuals who had “an uncommon zeal” 
both for indefeasible hereditary right and defaming Buchanan. He points out the 
origins of Ruddiman’s attack on Buchanan, placing it in the context of Jacobite 
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literature of the final years of Queen Anne, as Jacobites anticipated an early 
restoration.145 
Logan gives a panorama of the anti-Buchananite camp of Jacobite writers 
from 1711 onwards. He speaks of George Mackenzie, a medical doctor, and author 
of The Lives and Characters of the most Eminent Writers of the Scots Nation (1722); 
of John Sage and his introduction to the History of the … Five King James's by 
William Drummond of Hawthornden (1711); of George Mackenzie, the earl of 
Cromarty and his Vindication of Robert III (1695); of Patrick Abercromby and his 
most important work, the Martial Atchievements [sic] of the Scots Nation, published 
in Edinburgh in 1711 by Robert Freebairn, and in 1715 by Freebairn and Ruddiman; 
of John Hay of Drumboote’s Vindication (1723); and finally, the preface to 
Buchanan’s Opera Omnia (1715), published by Ruddiman. He adds that, all these 
people “agree in the main for supporting [indefeasible] hereditary right, and the 
legitimacy of Robert III.”146 
 We can see, at a glance, Logan’s Second Treatise is more concise and precise, 
but has a decidedly negative tone, in comparison to the first Treatise. The later work 
shows the change of his temper and his style of writing when he receives a criticism. 
After his comprehensive but concise dedication, his introduction displays 
preoccupation with personal attacks on himself. These, according to Logan, were 
extreme: he declared, “they threaten to make attempts upon my life, and on my 
character, which is dearer to me than life itself.” He observed that “their angry 
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passions are in a violent fermentation” and their spite directed at him “for publishing 
the truth”.147 He was particularly distressed by an anonymous letter. 
An anonymous Jacobite has been pleased to print a letter with this direction, 
To the Reverend Mr. G. Logan, A.M. one of the Ministers of Edinburgh. He 
had not the civility to send it me, till eight days after he had communicated it 
to his friends, or those of his own kidney.148 
… 
I am not to make a reply to the letters of one that keeps himself behind the 
curtain, having done him the honour, as fairly to make my compliments to 
him for his letters: but I shall satisfy myself, by giving an account of his 
dexterity in making his attacks upon me, and shifting the evidence I had 
advanced for my assertions.149 
… 
The next thing the letter writer quarrels me for, is in p.9 and it is “for my 
violent passion with the whole race of our Scots kings”: but this is not [the] 
fact, I am unwilling to use harsh words; I observed in my treatise…that 
several of them were raised to the throne for their rare virtues and excellent 
qualifications for government.150 
… 
The author of the printed letter, p.16, complains, “that I have given partial 
citations of my authorities, as best suited my purpose.” It is good that he 
owns, that I have cited authorities which suited my purpose; but it was his 
business to have shown the partiality, by bringing forth citations from my 
authorities, that either contradict or overthrow the purpose for which I 
brought my citations; till this is done, my citations must bear faith.151 
 
The overreaction to the anonymous letter-writer, to whom he devotes a number of 
pages, refuting him, makes an awkward introduction to the main subject. The 
anonymous letter-writer would have been better mentioned elsewhere, in a few 
sentences, if at all. The discussion in the Second Treatise, which is mainly about the 
legitimacy of the marriage of the first Stuart king, Robert II, and the bastardy of the 
second Stuart king, Robert III, is somewhat diminished by this display of personal 
grievance. Reacting to criticism in this nervous way, the Second Treatise refers 
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continually to his former work, which, according to Logan, had already disposed of 
the Jacobites’ objections.152 
 The Whig discussion of the question of the legitimacy of Robert III mainly 
centred on parliamentary legitimisation. Colin Kidd, who studied the nature of 
Scottish Whig historiography, states that Whig historians concerned with the 
dynastic history of Scotland, as well as “waging their own debates over national 
contracts and conquests,” had their own ancient version of the “warming pan myth” 
in the supposed bastardy of Robert III. According to Kidd, Whig historians found the 
whole Stuart monarchy rested on a parliamentary basis – like the Revolution of 1688. 
If the Scottish parliament had not legitimated Robert III, the whole line of kings 
descended from Robert III would have been mere pretenders. The claim of Robert III 
to succeed his father, Robert II, was realised by a parliamentary act of legitimisation, 
in 1371. Parliament had the power to secure the Stuarts, the prince and princess of 
Orange, Queen Anne, and the heirs of Princess Sophia of Hanover.153 Logan, as a 
representative of the Whig interpreters of this question, tells the whole story thus: 
Robert II married Euphemia, daughter of the earl of Ross, and had three children, 
among whom were Walter earl of Athol and David earl of Strathern. The problem 
occurred because Robert II, before that marriage, had as a mistress Elizabeth Mure, 
daughter of Sir Adam Mure, and by her had three sons and two daughters. The eldest 
of these children, John, succeeded him as Robert III. John changed his name because 
of its association with Balliol. Its “unpatriotic desecration” required him to do so. 
Later, Elisabeth Mure married one Gifford, who died at about the same time as 
Queen Euphemia. Now, Robert II was inclined to marry Elisabeth Mure, mother of 
his children, among whom John was the eldest and, if legitimate, the nearest heir to 
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the throne. After his second union with Elisabeth, Robert II bestowed honours on her 
children, by making John earl of Carrick and his brothers earls of Buchan and 
Monteith. In order to overcome the problem of legitimacy, he asked the parliament to 
pass over his sons by Euphemia Ross and legitimise his eldest son John (later, Robert 
III), making him heir to the throne. This is done, as he wanted, despite the fact that 
Robert III was his bastard son and rescued by the parliamentary legitimisation 
regardless of his problematic situation.154 
 The story, which Logan tells as the foundation of his argument that strict 
hereditary succession was interrupted by the coronation of a bastard, on the strength 
of parliamentary election, in 1371, was very weak, indeed, in comparison to the 
Jacobite vindications of Robert III.155 However, it would be inappropriate to criticise 
Logan mere because he inherited a bad historical argument. His approach can be 
evaluated with reference to two different matters. Firstly, he was not bound by the 
pattern of discussion determined by Jacobites; one can observe him in opening a new 
approach to the discussion. He had argued in his former Treatise, leaving aside 
parliament’s declaration of legitimacy, that the clerical approval of the marriage of 
Robert II to Elisabeth Mure was against the law of God.156 However, in the later 
Treatise there is hardly any reference to this, but many references to charters and 
parliamentary acts. This change of approach can be variously examined, in many 
ways, for example, with reference to a change in the quality of scholarship.  
One of Logan’s motivations for writing another treatise was doubtlessly his 
wish to strengthen his historical arguments. However, the weakness of the 
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argumentation, especially on the legitimacy of Robert III, in his Second Treatise, is 
more marked than even that of the first Treatise. Duncan criticises Logan for his 
emphasis on the papal dispensation. He disapproves of Logan’s “naïve and totally 
unphilosophic acceptance of items of faith,”157 and criticises him for trying to 
“appeal against a watertight historical verdict,”158 and devoting long passages to 
prove the illegitimacy of the Stuart line. The legitimacy of Robert III had been 
proven conclusively by many Jacobites. Duncan lists them, as given on the title 
pages of Logan’s two treatises, Sage, Cromarty, etc. The criticism of Logan by 
Duncan, however, reveals a secular bias, in keeping with his general enthusiasm for 
the Enlightenment. Eighteenth-century Scotland would have appreciated Logan’s 
arguments.159 All in all, we can conclude that Logan was attempting to supplement 
his former treatise, with more sophisticated inquiries into controversial issues like 
that of Robert III’s legitimacy. He was no doubt self-conscious of his inadequacy in 
plausibly dealing with the Jacobite scholars: Duncan’s criticism that Logan’s inquiry 
was vague on the bastardy of Robert III is in part true.160 Leaving aside the religious 
argument, his treatment of the matter is weak.161  
As indicated, Logan’s purpose in writing the Second Treatise was to produce 
a more sophisticated work, which would weaken the hand of the scholars of the 
Jacobite cause, and might save Whig scholarship from an appearance of inertia, after 
a half-century in which Jacobite scholarship had not encountered a serious scholarly 
blow from any adversaries. The interesting point in the both treatises is that Logan 
addresses Ruddiman insistently even though there was no work by Ruddiman from 
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the time Logan wrote. One has to go back to Ruddiman’s Annotationes in his edition 
of Buchanan’s Opera Omnia, which had been produced in 1715. Buchanan’s enemy 
is his target. On the other hand, his chief concern is to combat belief in strict 
hereditary right: he does not apparently write to rescue Buchanan; but he defends his 
most valuable heritage. Both treatises deal with the core question of hereditary 
succession. As Logan himself indicates, the Second Treatise is an “impartial” review 
of his former Treatise to make his view of the nature of the hereditary succession 
more acceptable.162 However, on the whole, he was less than successful. The Second 
Treatise was not especially convincing in its argumentation. Many examples could 
be cited from the Second Treatise which reveal Logan’s inability to produce effective 
counter-arguments to those of Jacobite scholars. Some of them are significant, like 
his attempt to refute the criticism of John Hay of Drumboote concerning the 
inconsistency between Buchanan’s accounts and a charter of October 19, 1378. 
Logan quotes Hay: 
…Queen Euph[e]m[ia] was alive anno 1378, which was five years after 
Buchanan puts her in the grave, and consequently, that the marriage he 
patches up betwixt Elisabeth and King Robert, the third year of his reign, is 
inconsistent with the truth…163 
Logan answers this criticism by questioning the charter’s reliability. 
Mr. Hay’s argument much depends upon the authenticity of the Parisian 
charter... I have fully shown that it is a forgery. As to this charter now 
produced, it is not an original, it is transcribed from we do not know what...164 
There is no other reference to the charter, let alone a passage questioning the 
reliability with sound points, in the course of the Second Treatise. All that might 
support Logan in his refusal to acknowledge the errors in Buchanan’s accounts are is 
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the previously mentioned comments at the very beginning of the treatise on the 
questionable character of almost all of the charters of the fourteenth century.165 
 There are, of course, many passages questioning strict hereditary succession 
in the Second Treatise. However, these are generally mere speculations and displays 
of wordiness on the disputed points. For example, according to one paragraph, 
[a]n hereditary indefeasible succession of kings has never actually taken place 
in any one kingdom of the universe: it is an Chimera, having only as ideal 
existence in the irregular imaginations of a party, who are for supporting the 
unlimited and arbitrary power of the prince. This succession in monarchy can 
no more be proved, than that of the hierarchy, or of popes from St. Peter, 
(absurdly called the first Pope of Rome) down to his present Holiness, is 
proved by the learned Italian antiquaries.166 
The scattered reasoning in Logan’s Second Treatise is far more disturbing than his 
failures in the former one. His later work does not offer any new insight to the 
controversial issues, but is merely a faint repetition of the Treatise, despite his 
attempt to produce a more secular discussion by focusing on the charters and offering 
a detailed table of the kings in the appendix. 
 The chief characteristic of Logan’s Second Treatise is that it replaces 
elaboration of argument with an emphasis on sources. Although the arguments he 
puts forward are far from being strong and decisive, there is an attempt to strengthen 
them with what later generations would value more – an emphasis on mere events, 
rather than the historian’s comments on them. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
IN RESPONSE TO LOGAN: RUDDIMAN’S ANSWER AND THE 
DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
There may be several reasons why Ruddiman was the most prominent scholar 
to produce refutations to Logan’s works, all of which have some significance. 
However, the main reason of the production of two important studies by Ruddiman, 
his Answer to the Reverend Mr. George Logan’s late Treatise of Government (1747) 
and the Dissertation concerning the Competition for the Crown of Scotland (1748), is 
no doubt the impact of Logan’s works. Although these were not perfect pieces of 
accomplished scholarship, they were good enough to create a question mark on 
certain issues, and these matters became the core of the debate between them. Before 
these tracts of Ruddiman’s only anti-Whig work was his Annotations affixed to 
Buchanan’s Opera Omnia. After the appearance of the two treatises of Logan, 
Ruddiman began to conduct debates and refutations with Whig-Presbyterian 
thinkers, which were “ostensibly historical” and on political allegiance.167 Apart 
from the two works examined in this study thoroughly, he also produced Anticrisis 
(1754) and Audi Alteram Partem (1756) against James Man (1700?-1761), a 
Presbyterian philologist from Aberdeen, in response to his abusive work, A Censure 
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and Examination (1753), harshly criticising Ruddiman on his philological and 
political notes damaging to the reputation of Buchanan. Ruddiman also produced his 
controversial work, Animadversions (1749), against the Vindication of Mr. George 
Buchanan (1749) of John Love (1695-1750), a critic of Ruddiman both in Latin 
grammar and political thinking. However, among all of the studies by Ruddiman, the 
most valuable can be said to be those two works produced in response to Logan.168 
Moreover, his debate with Logan contributed highly to his reputation, which 
continues to be that of a notable cornerstone of Scottish Jacobite historiography of 
his age.169 While examining his works, the Answer to Logan and the Dissertation, it 
is better to avoid the long and detailed explanations in the works, speculations on 
diverse issues that are not directly related to his debate with Logan, long accounts of 
his detailed notes on previous historiography, and passages that are mere repetition 
and rhetorical elaborations.  
IV.1 Answer to Logan  
Logan received, as he expected, a full-scale reply from Ruddiman, which was 
published in 1747.170 Ruddiman’s Answer was a large book, a comprehensive 
scholarly inquiry approximately four hundred pages in length. The main intention of 
the Answer is demonstrating with clarity the legitimacy of King Robert III, and 
discovering and rectifying “several considerable mistakes and falsehoods” in the 
works of common historians and others of his age.171 One can say that the book is a 
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recapitulation of the earlier works of many Jacobite scholars, with no hesitation in 
repeating what had been already said.172 
Ruddiman addresses “the candid and impartial reader,” in his preface of the 
Answer. This is, in comparison to Logan’s openings, more straightforward and 
purposeful. He had no need to praise a patron or to declare reasons for a patron’s 
support of the work. Ruddiman, sure of the significance of his work, firstly explains 
his preface. 
Although the following treatise has, contrary to my first intention, swelled to 
too great a bulk already; yet as there are some things that may be thought 
necessary for the readers farther information and satisfaction in the matter, 
which could not so conveniently be brought into the body of the book itself, I 
am obliged to give them a place here by way of preface… 
Then he declares himself no controversialist: 
I never had an inclination to debates of any kind, so this I am now engaged in 
had not its rise from any writings of mine own upon controversial subjects; 
but from some annotations, prefaces and the like, which I was desired to 
make on the writings of others.173 
Ruddiman declares that he did not intend to blacken the reputation of 
Buchanan. He recounts that he was employed to oversee the edition of Buchanan’s 
Opera by Freebairn, and he only desired to have it published more appropriately by 
rendering it as correct as possible. He mentions that he especially studied the Rerum 
Scoticarum Historia (the second volume of the Opera), which was the most 
considerable work of “that great man’s performances.”174 His intention was not to 
attack Buchanan but to make his works more acceptable and entertainable, by 
making certain corrections in the light of other historical documents, i.e. public 
records, ancient manuscripts, and other collections, which contradicted the writings 
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of Buchanan. He praises Buchanan as a truly “celebrated historian,” and claims to 
have prevented him falling into inferior estimation by dealing with the errors in his 
Opera and the – especially politically imbued – points in his works by producing his 
preface to them.175 By doing this he admits he attracted the hostility of many, such as 
Logan; but their hostility had no just foundation.176 Ruddiman also accuses Logan of 
being the aggressor in the debate and complains of his anticipating his own answer. 
As previously mentioned,177 Logan was aware that Ruddiman was writing a 
refutation of his first treatise, and would not wait to receive it. Ruddiman sees Logan 
spoiling for a fight, not looking for scholarly discussion.178 All this was certainly 
disingenuous, but not false. 
The influence of Logan’s “impatience” on Ruddiman’s work is clear. A 
glance at the Answer of Ruddiman reveals that the work consists of two parts, not 
clearly divided, but different in style. The first part is on the debate over the claims 
of Bruce and Balliol and second half deals mainly with the legitimacy of Robert III. 
This gives an extremely detailed, but straightforward explanation, running to several 
pages. It is quite clear that Ruddiman started writing a refutation of Logan’s first 
treatise and altered his course when he received the Second Treatise.179 However, 
this was hardly a just cause for complaint. After all, Logan’s Second Treatise broadly 
speaking contained nothing not previously examined and the urgency felt by 
Ruddiman to produce his refutation as quickly as possible was not increased. 
Ruddiman sought merely to say he might have done better and blame Logan for his 
not doing so. By merging his earlier writings answering Logan’s first treatise with 
                                                 
175 Ibid., iv-v. 
176 Ibid., v. and 66. See also Logan, Treatise, p.24. 
177 See p.59 above. 
178 Ruddiman, Answer to Logan, v. 
179 For the continuing complaints of Ruddiman on this issue see p. vi. 
 73
those he added after he received his second treatise, Ruddiman was able to produce a 
very comprehensive study, and had a chance to produce a refutation of Logan’s two 
treatises in a one-volume study. On the other hand, Logan was able to interrupt the 
process of Ruddiman’s by writing another treatise. As Ruddiman complains about 
the “impatience”, it becomes more obvious that Logan was successful in annoying 
him. It was all part of the tactics of debate. 
Ruddiman addresses Logan reproachfully, finding Logan very harsh on him. 
He mentions two things insistently in his preface: one is the accusation that he 
abused the favours of his supporters in producing the edition of Buchanan’s works 
and the second that he was successful in the “nicking of the time” in publishing his 
prefaced edition of Opera Omnia in the year of an almost successful Jacobite 
rising.180 Ruddiman, of course, rejects both of these claims. He mentions that Lord 
Advocate Sir David Dalrymple and Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun only provided the 
material, books etc., used in the preparation of his edition of Opera, were intelligent 
enough to know his own views about Buchanan, and sophisticated enough not to be 
overly concerned about what they might take to be his failings.181 Again, he denies 
that the writing of his annotations on Buchanan were politically timed, asserting that 
most of them “were written when there was not the least appearance of any 
rebellion” and adding that what he had done constituted nothing more than a search 
for truth.182 Ruddiman gained from Logan’s presenting of his own judgements about 
him as fact, and successfully made use of this accusation by mirroring it back on 
Logan, who is not, he suggests, politically up to date: 
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I am confident they can give none [offence] to the true and steady friends of 
his present majesty, whose title and that of his posterity to the throne of 
Britain is founded upon the principles I maintain. Our author may think he 
has nicked the time of ingratiating himself with his majesty’s government, in 
asserting the contrary: but I have great reason to believe he will find himself 
much mistaken.183 
 Getting closer to the subject of debate, Ruddiman expresses his contentment 
that he was treated “in a decent and civil manner” in Logan’s “small treatise” which 
came forth in the beginning of that year, although, he observes, the subject of the 
government of Scotland was by that time quite exhausted: there had already been 
many works published. It was useless to attempt to deal with a well explained 
subject, contending against the respectable historians, i.e. Sage, Mackenzie. He 
criticises Logan, again in a striking way as he did in the discussion about “nicking 
the time,” for addressing and criticising writers, who, except Ruddiman himself, 
were, being dead, unable to reply to his criticisms. Thus, he asserts his responsibility 
to restore the esteem in which they are held.184 
 Ruddiman’s argument is straightforward: “the Crown of Scotland was 
hereditary, and did not depend on the suffrages of the people.” However, the 
discussion he undertook is not so easily presented. Logan, also, was not a supporter 
of suffrage-based, quasi-democratic structures. He appeals to the moderation of 
Logan’s position. Again, Logan is made to appear anxious for a fight. 
Where is my fault in so saying? I do not say whether [the Crown of Scotland] 
was strictly and absolutely hereditary, but simply that it was hereditary. And 
was not this the constitution or rule of succession in this kingdom, from the 
days at least of Kenneth III as is agreed on by all our historians.185 
Ruddiman makes much of Logan’s historical argumentation, asserting that the 
hereditary succession can be interrupted; but no interruptions do “absolutely overturn 
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and destroy the constitution, or hinder it from running into the same channel 
again”.186 Rebellions and usurpations there always had been, in Scotland and in other 
hereditary kingdoms; but the law of succession did not necessarily change however 
frequently and decisively it had been violated. 
 On the competition between Bruce and Balliol, Ruddiman did not have the 
easy side of the debate. It might well be asserted that Jacobite historians had the 
question as a constant burden on the shoulder. Only one of them, George Mackenzie 
(1669-1725), freed himself from that burden by arguing straightforwardly that Bruce 
held Scotland by right of conquest. Then again, Jacobites who claimed that Balliol 
had been selected not on the grounds of constitutional right, but because of his 
readiness to accept Edward I as his superior feudal lord, ignored or overlooked the 
fact that Bruce the Competitor had also acknowledged Plantagenet suzerainty and 
was ready to accept the feudal overlordship of Edward, the moderator of their 
competition.187 Ruddiman, despite the difficulty of offering an explanation of the 
Great Cause as a refutation of Logan, showed himself as the abler debater, by using 
his talents of rhetoric.188  
Ruddiman states that there had been an established rule of succession by 
proximity of blood. He stresses that both claimants’ competition for the crown was 
proper: they had their constitutional right, in that the constitution required as simply 
continuo in genere proximos. By stressing the importance of the established 
character of this provision, Ruddiman consciously ignores Logan’s overstressed 
interest in parliamentary legitimacy. The important point for Ruddiman is that “the 
son of a second daughter, or the grandson of the eldest daughter, ought to be 
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preferred.”189 Further, he agrees that accepting the intervention of Edward was a 
great mistake, but turns the point to an argument against belief in a tendency to 
election. 
I hope the of Scotland did not remit it to King Edward to ch[oo]se a king for 
them; for what would have both been attended with dangerous consequences, 
and (if mere election was the rule) could more easily and regularly have been 
executed by themselves at home.190 
Ruddiman argues that if the landowners had the ability to eliminate the other 
claimants to the throne, leaving the two strongest, then they should have chosen the 
most suitable for the throne, according to the tradition of lex regni, by themselves. 
He rejects any elective power in the parliament convened under the auspices of 
Edward I. The judges in that parliament “had merely been judges of the facts of the 
issue” – and not reluctant to transfer to Edward I’s side.191 The only problem with his 
account, which was of central importance, is that it does not clarify or even mention 
the distinction between primogeniture and tanistry, which provided the basis of the 
claims of Balliol and Bruce, respectively. Logan had insistently stressed the 
importance of primogeniture as the true lex regia of the time.192 If it was not, there 
had been no violation. Nevertheless, this point hardly suited Ruddiman either. 
Another matter disagreed by Ruddiman was the right of the son of Balliol in his 
Answer. Robert Bruce, the grandson of the Competitor, had the same generational 
proximity to David of Huntingdon as Balliol’s son. Besides, Colin Kidd points out, 
with reference to contemporary argument, that the “Jacobite gloss” on the removal of 
the John of Balliol as “self-deposition” did not explain how this could prevent a 
claim by his son.193 
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Ruddiman argues that it was far from being certain that Balliol had the right 
to the throne. His argument to support this doubt is weak. The justification given for 
the action of Edward I and the parliament he convened in adjudicating in favour of 
Balliol was that they behaved according to laws and customs of both kingdoms. 
However, it was doubtful whether Scotland had such a legal tradition. This argument 
of Ruddiman is odd. Since he did not argue on clear legal grounds and did not prove 
that the legal practices of the two kingdoms were fundamentally different from each 
other, his argument was not able to prove anything about the problem of legal right 
to the throne. It is also unclear whether he accuses Balliol of disregarding the 
customs of his people or accuses Edward I for doing so. This makes the whole 
argument a more confused one. Ruddiman did state that “the right to a crown does 
not descend the same way as it does in private estates”.194 This might have been a 
good starting point for examining the whole question of fourteenth-century Scottish 
political right, if he had continued to speculate and argue on this matter. However, 
there is no other reference in his Answer to it. 
Ruddiman’s account of the Fergusian monarchy undermines Buchanan and 
consequently Logan. Ruddiman uses the Chronica of Fordun as a way of repudiating 
Buchanan. Although both Ruddiman and Logan agreed that the Chronica was not 
reliable enough to produce sound arguments,195 they both made use of it quite 
extensively, interpreting it as they desired. In this case, Ruddiman opted for it. It had, 
after all, “assisted royalists in its account of the Fergusian monarchy.”196 The main 
argument derives from the account given by Fordun of the Fergusian election, where 
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he asserted that Fergus had made himself king over the Scots.197 Logan and 
Ruddiman interpreted the election, or accession, of Fergus in different ways. As 
mentioned before, Logan relies upon the account of Buchanan, which explains the 
succession as an election by the chieftains of the most suitable candidate for 
kingship.198 Ruddiman approaches the issue, conversely, not focusing on the 
succession, but on dethronement. It was a clever approach to the issue, since it would 
be much more illuminating to consider the power of ius populi when popular 
dethronements took place. Ruddiman argues that, according to Fordun, there were no 
such dethronements, though there were circumstances that might have justified it, 
had it been though possible.199 Ruddiman asserts that there is no sign of a popular 
power superior to the power of the king. However, he does accept that the king was 
chosen with the consent of chieftains: he merely asserts that there was no occasion in 
the history of the Scottish kings that one of them was deposed by popular will or by 
the will of the nobility. He makes reference to the wishes of the clergy, which he 
held to have influence on the consent of the nobility; but he is not clear to what 
extent the clergy used its power.200  
The summary of Ruddiman’s account on the power structure in the very early 
days of the line of the Scottish kings and onwards included a refutation of Buchanan 
in famous king-killing doctrine. It is not possible to kill a king by popular will. Kings 
might have been killed, but not for political reasons.  
And yet [Fordun] adds, that, notwithstanding his great wickedness, he was 
slain, not by a council of his nobles, but, by one great man among them 
named Hadardus, whose daughter he had ravished.201 
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Ruddiman, however, points out that Buchanan was not the originator of the king-
killing doctrine, but was inspired by the anti-monarchical principles set forth by 
Hector Boethius (c.1465-1536), the author of the famous Scotorum Historiae 
(1527).202 He also notes that 
…as the people could judge and punish our lawful kings for their faults, 
Buchanan did not take his pattern from them, but from the Roman and other 
ancient histories, in which kings are treated very contemptuously…203 
He remarks too that not only at the beginning of the royal line, but later, Scottish 
kings exercised absolute authority, unbounded by any restriction by the nobility. The 
most significant example he gives is the ability of King Malcolm to distribute the 
whole territory of Scotland among his followers.204 Though this account of the 
introduction of feudalism was doubtful, Ruddiman did not hesitate to use it in 
strengthening his case.  
 The Jacobite case on the question of the reputed bastardy of Robert III, was 
good and consequently accepted even by some Whigs like James Dalrymple and 
Clerk of Penicuik.205 Jacobites, including Ruddiman, agree that Buchanan’s patron, 
the Earl of Murray and the bastard half-brother of Mary, Queen of Scots, influenced 
the content of Buchanan’s account. Originally, Robert III’s bastardy was a positive 
precedent. If one bastard might become king, so might another. Buchanan turned an 
historical error into an ideology and was responsible for the general belief of the 
bastardy of Robert III. The discovery of a charter dated 12 January 1364 in Glasgow 
Cathedral, mentioning the approval of the marriage of Robert II, proved that there 
                                                 
202 Nicola Royan, Boece , Hector (c.1465–1536), in New DNB. For related theoretical arguments, see 
Ferguson, The Identity of the Scottish Nation, 79 and 83-4; Lynch, Scotland, 346-7 and Allan, Virtue, 
Learning and the Scottish Enlightenment, 149, 150-3, and 177. 
203 Ruddiman, Answer to Logan, 62. 
204 Ibid., 83, 86-7; Kidd, Subverting Scotland’s Past, 85. Kidd cites the original phrase, “Dominus rex 
Malcolmus dedit et distribuit omnem terram Scotiae hominibus suis,” from John Skene, Regiam 
Majestatem Scotiae, Veteres Leges et Constitutiones (London, 1613), p. 1. 
205 Kidd, Subverting Scotland’s Past, 90-1. 
 80
was a chronological error in Buchanan. According to that document, Robert II had 
first married Elisabeth Mure. Only after the death of Elisabeth, the mother of John, 
who would become Robert III later, Robert II married Euphemia Ross. The charter 
was sure evidence that Elisabeth Mure died before 1364, against the account of 
Buchanan that she married Robert II formally in 1374.206 The charter, cited fully by 
Ruddiman and many other scholars, demonstrated the error in Buchanan’s account, 
which was directly borrowed by Logan. Logan ignored the presence of the charter, 
and it is unlikely that he was not aware of it. If so, he had not read any of the Jacobite 
historical studies mentioning the problem of Robert II’s marriages. Thus, Logan tried 
to approach the subject not historically, but morally, from the perspective of the 
reliability of Buchanan’s account.  
Ruddiman’s Answer has a long and detailed discussion of this earlier 
marriage of Elisabeth and Robert II. However, the greatest part of his account is 
mere speculation and rhetoric. He may have thought that even if his position was far 
stronger than Logan’s in view of the 1364 Charter, it might appear weak without 
extensive discussion. With extensive use of other sources and accounts which make 
clear the errors in the chronology of the Buchananite account of the matter of Robert 
III, Ruddiman establishes a supremacy over Logan. 
IV.2 The Dissertation 
Ruddiman was in a more advantageous position than Logan on the issue of 
Robert III. However, his weakness in supporting the claim of Bruce in the Great 
Cause, and his slightly confused inquiries in his Answer to Logan on the subject may 
have motivated him to produce another work. Ruddiman was conscious of the lack of 
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the comprehensiveness in his Answer. Thus, he resolved to concentrate on the 
competition of Bruce and Balliol. His Dissertation Concerning the Competition for 
the Crown of Scotland, betwixt Lord Robert Bruce and Lord John Balliol, in the Year 
1291 (1748) is a work of 123 pages in length, more systematically examining the 
issue. It can be taken as a compensation of his passing over the ‘matter of the fact’, 
taking into account his previous Answer. This work was to show  
That by the laws of God and of nature, by the civil and feudal laws, and 
particularly by the fundamental law and constitution of Scotland, at that time, 
and ever since, the right of Robert Bruce was preferable to that of John 
Baliol.207 
Ruddiman’s preface to the Dissertation is not directly related to what is 
discussed in the body of his work. In the preface, he offers a general picture of when 
and how he was criticised; he mentions power and politics of the age in general, 
including short references to male-administration and gynarchy. He draws attention 
to his objectivity, as one who could criticise Buchanan for his political works, but 
praise him for his paraphrase of the Psalms.208 Still attempting to communicate his 
objectivity, he indicates that it was difficult to form judgements about the complex 
controversies over the principle of hereditary right, and the problems in the political 
reasoning of Buchanan’s De Iure Regni in general. By the way, he expresses some 
political principles, such as the king’s right being jure divino.209 A significant point 
in the preface is the indication that Jacobites and Whigs shared a common political 
tradition, of asserting the subjects’ rights. He rejects Logan’s anti-Jacobite rhetoric, 
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denying an extreme belief in non-resistance or adherence to any ‘slavish 
doctrines’.210  
Ruddiman considered that his Answer to Logan had indeed been a 
comprehensive work, which dealt with the nature and the history of the Scottish 
dynasty, in a degree sufficient to satisfy a reasonable reader.  
Altho[ugh] in my answer to Reverend Mr. Logan, I persuaded myself, that, to 
the conviction of all the unbiased part of my readers, I had so fully 
established the truth of the principle I was by that author called upon to 
defend…211 
There was, no doubt, little willingness on Ruddiman’s part to review the “fully 
established truth” contained in the Dissertation later in his Answer. However, he did 
want to fill the gaps now apparent in his argumentation and produce a more 
sophisticated work. Moreover, it may well be that failing to receive the approval he 
expected, he decided, like a patient teacher, to explain the whole matter again. Logan 
was in a more advantageous position than Ruddiman in the matter of criticism. The 
Scots Magazine – certainly important to both authors – was, for example, under 
Whig control. To persuade this predominantly Whig intellectual community, or to 
defeat it, Ruddiman decided to produce a thorough analytical study that would attract 
the attention of, for example, the British Magazine and the Scots Magazine, and 
strengthen his previous arguments.212 It seemed necessary to cover the whole 
argument again. 
Duncan was of the not unjustified view that Ruddiman’s Answer to Logan 
was an over-laborious study, too long, certainly in relation to its content. Certainly, 
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his Dissertation is much more a laborious study than the Answer to Logan. From 
page 3 onwards, Ruddiman buries his reader in details, directly related to the core of 
the discussion or not, and the main arguments are lost. No doubt, the feeling 
Ruddiman had at being on disadvantageous ground in this debate, shared by many 
Jacobites,213 made it comforting to bring forward as much auxiliary support as he 
could. 
One central argument in the Dissertation is a rejection of the claim that “it 
was merely by the election of the people that the prince came to the throne”. In 
dealing with this argument, he introduces the reader to an anonymous pamphlet, The 
Right of the House of Stewart considered, which approved the decision of Edward I 
in the dispute between Bruce and Balliol, “because it was in just agreement with the 
custom of Scotland”.214 By the way, though particular circumstances may explain 
this case, Ruddiman seems to have been much less upset by anonymous opponents, 
like this one, than Logan.215 He offered no criticism and did not complain about any 
unpleasantness of style or antagonism. He merely used the arguments of his 
opponent as starting points for his own. 
After making extensive direct quotations from his anonymous adversary, he 
explains the shortcomings in the opponents’ arguments. He declined to accept that 
the right belonged to Balliol, because of the strength of the claims of both sides. The 
pamphleteer had, of course, argued that the election of the parliament determined the 
right to the throne decisively. Thus, indeed, had Robert I himself come to the throne. 
Ruddiman here tackled the matter quite well, with the most straightforward passage 
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to be found in his works. Here, the Dissertation reads like a shortened and simplified 
form of his Answer. 
At the beginning, Ruddiman stresses the oddity in Logan’s conclusion, as a 
conclusion, where he asserted that usurpations happened quite frequently in the line 
of succession. He acknowledges that Robert I’s succession can be questioned as 
Logan does, but that this case is singular.216 The whole argument in the following 
pages is concerned with the error of Logan in questioning and opposing the Bruce 
claim. It is interesting to note the style of Ruddiman here, as he develops his 
arguments. Almost constantly, he dwells on the counter-arguments of his opponents 
and produces his own argument in response to their weaknesses. Therefore, his 
Dissertation is also an ‘answer’, like his previous study, for little new emerges. 
As an introductory summary – as the core of the matter – we can state that the 
main discussion is about the difference between the right of succession to the throne 
and being elected to the throne. Ruddiman constructs his first counter-attack on the 
intersection between those two elements of legitimacy. He cleverly asks if the right 
was the matter in the case of the succession of Robert I, then what reason was there 
for attempting to establish legitimacy based on election covered, but the dubious 
nature of John’s claim, patronised by Edward of England.217 He affirms that the 
legitimacy was only provided by the “point of [having] right,” which is was not 
known in this case. King Edward was “peremptory” in his decision. In fact, there was 
no place for allowing election to legitimise succession.218 In this perspective, 
Ruddiman starts to develop his own arguments against the foundations of the 
opposing case, the arguments in which he labels as “the most captious and fallacious 
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of all kind of reasoning.”219 Ruddiman argues, firstly, that if the crown of Scotland 
was considered a heritage, the right of John Baliol to it was nullified and by given to 
Bruce, by virtue of Balliol’s abandonment of the throne to Edward. 
Suppose [t]his first observation should be granted, that John Baliol had once a 
right to the succession, as the nearest heir; yet (not to speak that the states and 
people of Scotland were persuaded of the contrary) he had several years 
before Robert I mounted the throne, not only abdicated the government, but 
resigned and given up all the title and right he had to it, in the hands of the 
King of England. Robert I therefore could do him no injury in taking up that 
which he had laid down; or (which is the same) had given away from him. 
For, I hope, it will not be controverted, that when two or more are instituted 
heirs to an estate, if the first shall not accept it, or afterwards renounce all title 
to it, the second may lawfully enter upon possession. Robert Bruce was, if not 
the first, incontestably the second heir to the crown; and what should hinder 
him, after John Baliol had abandoned it, to claim it as now having become his 
just property? 220 
Finding it difficult to deny Balliol’s claim, he does not do so, but argues on the basis 
of his surrender of it. He continues, it should be noted, to regard the throne as a 
heritage, like a landed estate, or other sorts of private property. Secondly, he 
challenges the assertion that according to the doctrine of divine, hereditary and 
indefeasible right, Balliol’s son Edward ought to have succeeded him. Ruddiman 
explains this matter in three steps.  
For [first], if the abdication or the resignation of the father did include that of 
the son, then Edward Baliol was divested of the crown by that his father John 
Baliol’s deed. This is certain that in the succession of the private estates 
(which our authors will have to be the rule in the succession to a crown) the 
resignation or alienation of them to others than the next heir, will effectually 
cut off all pretensions these heirs could make to them. Whether this will hold 
with respect to the heirs of a kingdom is indeed by many controverted, but 
never, that I could learn, by the strenuous defenders of the late revolution. But 
[secondly], as this Edward Baliol did never otherwise claim right to the 
Crown of Scotland, but as a fee-liege of the Crown of England, he thereby 
destroyed his own title, tho’ it had been otherwise just and good. I hope there 
is no true-hearted Scotsman, who will not maintain, that the Crown of 
Scotland then and always was imperial, sovereign and independent; and that 
consequently the king, who subjected himself and it to another, did upon the 
matter un-king himself, and forfeit all right that he otherwise might have 
pretended to have to the sovereignty. But this is not all; for [thirdly], this 
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same Edward (in imitation of his father, who had resigned whatever right he 
had to the crown, to Edward I of England) did likewise resign his title to it in 
the hands of Edward III. This then being the case, it is plain, that whatever 
right either of the Baliols might otherwise pretend to the Scottish Crown, it 
was now as effectually extinguished, as if they never had existed; unless our 
author will be so absurd as to say, that one still retains a right to that which he 
has freely and voluntarily given away.221 
The discussion by Ruddiman above relates only tangentially to the core of the matter, 
that filial succession had or had not been interrupted. The second passage quoted 
above is mere rhetoric. However, Ruddiman convinces both his audience and himself 
that once the constitutional right was somehow, willingly or compulsorily, bestowed 
upon another, then the whole issue is changed into one about which one cannot easily 
speculate, with reference to the customs and tradition of the hereditary succession. 
The issue of ‘resignation’ from the right to the throne is fruitful for 
Ruddiman; but it is barely seen in these passages. However, when he begins to deal 
with the assertion that Robert Bruce, his son David and his descendents were all 
usurpers, he uses the theme of ‘resignation’ again. 
For if the two Baliols either never had, or, which is sufficient for my purpose, 
if they did absolutely and [e]ntirely give up and relinquish what right they 
might pretend to have to the Crown of Scotland, then it is as clear as meridian 
light can make it, that the reigns of Robert and David Bruces, and of the 
family of Steward, who derived right from them, were no usurpations, but as 
true and lawful an hereditary succession … If there was any usurpation in the 
case, it was upon the rights of the kings of England, to whom the Baliols had 
resigned theirs … These of the Baliol family having given up their title, and it 
being incompatible with the sovereignty of the kingdom, that a foreign prince 
could acquire a right to it.222 
To clarify again the purpose of this work, in view of criticisms of Ruddiman: our 
focus is the ability of Ruddiman and Logan in analytical reasoning and ability in 
rhetoric. Thus, the reliability of the historical information they give, the accuracy 
displayed in their works and their overcoming of anachronism are, partially, 
                                                 
221 Ibid., 9. 
222 Ibid., 10. 
 87
irrelevant here. Our present question is about the success of Ruddiman in finding 
ways of defeating an opponent’s argument. The ‘resignation’ argument was certainly 
flawed as an account of ‘how it actually happened’, but that was not primarily 
history’s business. Morality and politics was; and Ruddiman’s moral and political 
reasoning was successful. As Ruddiman himself says, he looked at the issues 
“according to the rules of just reasoning”.223 In the quotations above, for example, he 
constructs his argument on a “maxim in law, that possession gives right, when none 
other can show a better right”.224  Bruce came to possess the throne; Balliol could 
show no better claim and, in any case, had surrendered it. Although it is very 
questionable indeed, it serves as a sound basis for Ruddiman’s moral and political 
argument. Through his Dissertation effective arguments of this kind can be found 
frequently, whereas Logan is much weaker in convincing his audience. In other 
words, Ruddiman’s ability in scholarship is stronger both in reasoning and rhetoric. 
Moreover, there is no effort on Ruddiman’s part to prove that he is perfectly 
impartial in the matter of the competition between Bruce and Baliol. He plainly 
defends Bruce in the Dissertation. This considerably improves his arguments.225 He 
is no impartial judge of the events – and this brought him credit for his frankness. 
Ruddiman held that, the right of representation was a rather recent 
phenomenon and one misunderstood by his contemporaries. He held that there was 
no “fixed general law, which had always and everywhere obtained in the world to 
this day” in the matter of succession.226 Representation was throughout much of the 
world’s history; but “proximity of blood was the only rule by which not only 
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moveable, but immoveable goods and possessions were transmitted”.227 At first 
sight, these two assertions seem contradictory. However, the contradiction is 
removed when it is understood that his term ‘fixed general law’ refers only to human 
law. Succession by proximity of blood was, on the contrary, divine law. This is a law 
above all other laws, which “was established by Almighty God himself.”228 Citing 
Scripture, in particular the Old Testament, he turns the jus repræsentationis into a 
right obtained only by proximity of blood. The right of representation, allowing the 
concept of election, was thus far inferior to right by proximity of blood and 
dispensable. It practice it was often dispensed with. He cites historical examples. 
Tacitus informs us, that the same rule was observed among the ancient 
Germans. And it appears from the laws of the [V]isigoths… The right of 
representation did not take place in the German Empire till the time of Ot[t]o 
I. anno 942; but that in after ages was quite abolished, till it was re-
established by Maximilian I, anno 1500… [A]mong the French, in the 
succession to the grandfather’s inheritance, the uncle was constantly preferred 
to the grandson… [T]hroughout most of the low countries, as Holland, 
Flanders, Guelderland, the Dioces[e] of Utrecht, Hainault, Artois, Zealand, 
Overyssel, and others, the right of succession to their fiefs does not descend 
by representation, but by proximity of blood only.229  
Ruddiman argues that the succession to the Scottish crown was regulated 
according to the rules governing succession to feudal tenures, after the time of 
Kenneth III.230 However, before feudal practices influenced the constitution, 
proximity of blood was accepted as of divine institution. He notes the difference 
between higher and lower fiefs.231 Of course, the right to the throne could not be 
governed by rules regulating feuda inferiora. Thus, Ruddiman explains the system of 
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the power by proximity of blood upon His own peculiar people, the Israelites. 
229 Ibid. 
230 Ibid., 18. 
231 Ibid., 21-2. 
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succession as a product of divine law, with an adumbration of feudal law. In his 
formulation, there is no place for representation at all. 
Neither Ruddiman nor Logan offers an ideal system of succession; nor do 
they press their cases to extremes. They are not at the opposite extremes of their 
respective ideologies. In any case, these ideologies themselves had common ground 
on the thought of eighteenth-century Britons.232 Ruddiman allows for flexibility. 
Feudal law relating to private inheritance is frequently used and spoken of, because it 
serves his thesis. This is the reason he insists on feudal law with its insistence on 
proximity of blood to be the universally accepted law of succession. However, he 
does not argue for a rigid law that does not allow for anything extraordinary. He does 
not advocate feudal law as the only regulator of succession to the throne. The 
foundation of his argument, though, must be preserved and there is absolute rejection 
of the view that “the succession to private inheritances cannot be a rule to that of 
sovereign kingdoms.” Still, he is willing to accept the degree of flexibility expressed 
in the statement that “the right to a crown does not, or may not, descend the same 
way as it does in some of these private estates.”233 
In certain sections of the Dissertation, Ruddiman complains of being 
misunderstood by his antagonists. No doubt he was, often wilfully. He insisted that 
he was arguing for a general principle: that the throne of Scotland was not elective, 
but hereditary. His opponents were unjust in drawing other opinions, which he never 
held, from his statements. He had never claimed that the right of kings over their 
subjects were the same as any man’s rights over his private property – that all 
                                                 
232 See above, p.6. See also Gunn, Beyond Liberty and Property, 120-1; Dickinson, Liberty and 
Property, 13-59, 124. 
233 Ruddiman, Dissertation, 25. 
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hereditary rights were the same.234 He was speaking of a hereditary right “in general, 
as it is distinguished from election, without respect to the various manners in which it 
is, by law or custom, particularly conveyed.”235 What he opposed was election – in 
particular, that election he believed to have taken place in 1689. In this, he was not 
too far from his opponents, who denied that an election had taken place in 1689. 
Whigs and Jacobites had common ground. It became visible only a few decades later, 
in the reign of George III. In the days after the ’45, when Ruddiman and Logan were 
writing, that common ground was hard to see. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
234 Ibid., 28-9. See also Ruddiman, Answer to Logan, 37, 41. 
235 Ruddiman, Dissertation, 29. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
Logan and Ruddiman were not mere intellectuals. They did have certain 
political intentions in producing their works. They sometimes used mere rhetoric to 
make their assertions. Thus, they were politically biased; their works are not 
objective and impartial ones. However, this does not mean that they did not produce 
considerable studies valuable to the readers and writers of Scottish history in their 
period and afterwards. For one who studies intellectual and political history, two 
necessary phenomena, historical accuracy, within a coherent theoretical framework 
can be found in their works. 
In the preceding chapters, a judgement has been made about who was the 
better debater on the topic of the constitutional and dynastic history of Scotland. 
Certainly, both scholars have strong or weak points in comparison to the other. 
However, in general, neither of them can be dismissed as a mere pamphleteer. 
Logan’s two treatises, for example, offer a Whig explanation of the nation’s dynastic 
history with reference to respected chronicles and the works of its rightly esteemed 
historians, such as Boece, Buchanan, Fordun, etc. He produced Whig history, not 
merely bulky political pamphlets. Ruddiman refers to the same authorities as Logan 
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does. The difference between them lies in their judgements of these sources. 
Ruddiman, albeit a Jacobite partisan, was not merely destructive in his approach to 
Whig sources and arguments. He successfully, certainly more competently than 
Logan, produced historical inquiries – regardless of the extent they may be called 
biased – justifying well his religion, morality and politics. In fact, both authors strike 
us as more akin to moral philosophers than to later historians. Such was the character 
of eighteenth-century history writing. The very lack of clear-cut distinction between 
politics and morality, between religion and politics, and between history and all 
three, allows these texts to present a panorama which greatly aids understanding of 
the period as a whole.  
This study, centred on the debate of Logan and Ruddiman, has a large 
measure of literary criticism. It is hoped that this study indicates how such an 
approach to these analytical works assists historical understanding. Indeed, 
conventional categorisations in the study of eighteenth-century Scotland seem 
unsatisfactory if we take into account the course of the arguments of Ruddiman and 
Logan. Common patterns of thought, and not mere contrast, appear. For example, as 
a Whig, Logan never favoured a parliamentary democracy in which the hereditary 
monarchy was reduced to insignificance, and never adhered to the Buchananite king-
killing doctrines. On the other hand, Ruddiman, as a Jacobite, never argued that the 
succession to the throne of Scotland had always been strictly hereditary, but merely 
argued that it could not be asserted that disruptions in the royal line could be taken as 
substantial changes, which altered the constitution. Their discussion is far from using 
crude and extreme arguments.  
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In fact, the difference between the two is a disagreement about the matter of 
flexibility. Logan is more flexible on the question of hereditary succession, 
Ruddiman much less so. In this, they reflect the politics of their time and display 
their links to political events. Logan obviously wrote studies which he expected to be 
well received by the Hanoverian regime; and Ruddiman was essentially influenced 
by the Jacobite rebellions, which came close to overthrowing the regime. However, 
politics, Whig and Jacobite, sought consensus in the political nation and the 
slightness of difference between their approaches reflects this too. 
Historical, particularly political, narrative is inadequate. One may too easily 
interpret what is referred to in the narrative in anachronistic, modern terms and thus 
relate the past to the present in a superficial, simplistic and false way. The study of 
intellectual history contributes to a correction of this. In the study of these 
contemporary authors, Ruddiman and Logan, we see indeed the conflicts of 
eighteenth-century Scotland, which take centre stage in political narrative. However, 
we also inevitably note the similarities of their thought in response to the world 
around them, a shared world. Thus the conflicts are brought into perspective and 
their distance from our world a little better perceived. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
GENEALOGICAL LIST OF THE KINGS OF SCOTLAND 
 
 
 
The following is a composite genealogical depiction of the Scottish succession, taken 
from the following sources: Norman Davies, The Isles: A History (London: 
Papermac, 2000); Charles Petrie, The Jacobite Movement (London: Eyre & 
Spottiswoode Publishers, 1932); G. W. S. Barrow, Robert Bruce and the Community 
of the Realm of Scotland, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1982). 
 
 
 
 
DAVID I, 1124-53 
 
 
Earl Henry (d. 1152) 
 
 
MALCOLM IV, WILLIAM I,    David, Earl of 
1153-65  1165-1214    Huntingdon (d. 1219) 
 
 
   ALEXANDER II,  Margaret  Isabel 
   1214-49       
 
     
   ALEXANDER III,  Devorguilla  Robert  
   1249-86   =   Bruce the 
       John Baliol  Competitor 
          (d. 1295) 
   Margaret (d. 1283) 
    =   JOHN    
   Eric II, King of   acceded 1292  Robert 
   Norway   died 1313  Bruce 
          jure uxoris 
          earl of 
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   MARGARET,     Carrick 
   ‘the Maid of Norway’    (d. 1304) 
   Lady of Scotland 
   (d. 1290) 
       Isabella of Mar    = ROBERT 
        I DE 
        BRUCE 
1306-29 
          = 
          Elisabeth 
          de Burgh 
          (d. 1327) 
     
      
Marjory    =   Walter    DAVID II    =    Joan of England 
(d.1316)        the Steward  DE BRUCE        (1321-62) 
     (1329-71)      
 
 
ROBERT II STEWART (1371-90)  =  Elisabeth Mure 
 
 
ROBERT III (1390-1406)  =  Annabella Drummond (d.1401) 
 
 
JAMES I (1406-37)  =  Joan Beaufort (d.1445) 
 
 
JAMES II (1437-60)  =  Mary of Guelders (d.1463) 
 
 
JAMES III (1460-88)  =  Margaret of Denmark (d.1486) 
 
 
JAMES IV (1488-1513)  =  Margaret Tudor (1489-1541) 
 
 
JAMES V (1513-42)  =  Mary of Guise (1515-60) 
 
 
MARY (1542-67)  =  Henry Stewart (1545-67) 
 
 
JAMES VI (1567-1625)  =  Anne of Denmark (d.1619) 
 
 
CHARLES I = Henrietta Maria        Elizabeth = Frederick V 
(1625-49)  of France (d.1669)        (d.1662)    (1596-1632) 
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      Mary = Williem II     CHARLES II = Catherine       JAMES = Anne 
(1631-60)   of      (1651-85)       of Braganza     VII&II Hyde 
           Orange              (1638-1705)  (1685-88)  (1637-71) 
          
 
 
 
WILLIAM III = MARY ANNE (1702-14)  Sophie von =  Duke Ernst 
of Orange     (1689-94)     der  August 
(1689-1702)       Pfalz  of Hanover 
   JAMES III= Maria      (1630-1714) (d.1698) 
            (1688-1766)   Clementina 
              (d. 1735) 
 
        GEORGE I (1714-1727) 
 
CHARLES III   HENRY II 
(o.s.p.l. 1788)   (o. 1807) 
THE HANOVERIAN 
KINGS 
        OF ENGLAND 
